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REDUCING THE ROLE OF JURIES IN 




During the nomination hearings for now-Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh, considerable attention was drawn to a high school 
friend’s memoir featuring a fellow student named “Bart 
O’Kavanaugh.”1  By the memoir’s account, “O’Kavanaugh” in one 
episode blacked out—apparently from alcohol—on his return 
from a party.2  For any number of possible reasons, Justice 
Kavanaugh did not bring a libel suit against the book’s author.  If 
he had, however, a crucial threshold issue—preceding questions of 
falsity and intent—would have been whether the memoir’s 
portrayal of “O’Kavanaugh” amounted to a false depiction of 
Kavanaugh himself.  In the parlance of defamation doctrine, 
Justice Kavanaugh would have to establish that the descriptions 
of O’Kavanaugh’s behavior were “of and concerning” the  
Justice himself.3 
Though Kavanaugh did not bring such a suit, the outcome of 
many other libel cases has hinged on whether expression that does 
not explicitly refer to the plaintiff can nonetheless be treated as 
defamatory.  Much of this litigation arises from works that authors 
 
† John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University College 
of Law. The author would like to thank Michael Morley, Mark Spottswood, and Mark 
Joseph Stern for their important insights. Jessica Anderson, Celeste Murphy-Gerling, 
and Mary Kathryn King provided valuable research assistance. 
1  See Matthew Haag & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Mark Judge Says He’ll Talk to the F.B.I. 
Here’s What We Know About Him, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2018/09/27/us/mark-judge-kavanaugh-hearings.html. 
2 See Dwight Garner, What a Book Critic Finds in Mark Judge’s ‘Wasted’ 21 Years 
Later; Critic’s Notebook, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/ 
02/books/wasted-mark-judge-memoir.html. 
3 See infra Part I. 
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and publishers describe as fiction but which plaintiffs contend 
contain defamatory representations of them.4  Another frequent 
source involves members of a group who claim that, because they 
have been collectively tarred, they have also been individually 
defamed.5  In these and other cases where plaintiffs contend  
that the defendant’s description of repugnant conduct is tacitly 
about them, courts must first determine whether a jury could 
rationally find that a reasonable reader would ascribe that conduct 
to the plaintiff.6 
This Article argues that the law should expressly recognize  
a more dominant role for courts in resolving the issue of  
plaintiff identity.  Courts should not merely screen for minimum 
plausibility in plaintiffs’ claims that derogatory expression falsely 
casts them in a harsh light even though it does not purport to 
describe them.  Rather, courts should assertively employ First 
Amendment doctrine and a range of evidentiary tools to ensure 
that only genuinely ambiguous questions of plaintiff identity are 
submitted to the jury.  A specific mechanism by which to effectuate 
this proposal would be to require by statute that allegedly 
defamatory statements clearly refer to a plaintiff as a substantive 
condition for liability.  Such a change would reduce opportunities 
for dubious and practically unreviewable7 jury findings that a 
defendant has libeled the plaintiff in all but name.8  This approach 
may also promote judicial economy and relieve some of the 
scholarly criticism that judicial methods of ascertaining plaintiff 
identity have lacked clarity and coherence. 
Part I of this Article describes the “of and concerning” 
requirement against the backdrop of the constitutional regime the 
Supreme Court of the United States has established for 
defamation.  Part II explains the rationale for and operation of the 
proposed expansion of judicial prerogative in resolving issues of 
plaintiff identity.  In Parts III, IV, and V, this Article examines 
how such questions of alleged libel can be addressed in three 
settings: fiction, statements about a group, and virtual worlds. 
 
4 See infra Part III. 
5 See infra Part IV. 
6 See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
8 For the purposes of this Article, this category does not include instances where 
a writer of fiction employs the plaintiff’s name but represents that the character is 
meant as a fictional variation of the plaintiff. See infra note 164. 
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I. THE “OF AND CONCERNING” REQUIREMENT IN  
LAW AND PRACTICE 
Long before the Supreme Court brought libel law within the 
constitutional fold,9 courts recognized that successful defamation 
claims must show that the allegedly false statement refers to  
the plaintiff.10  A proper assessment of this element’s current 
significance, however, must take account of the limitations on libel 
actions now imposed by the First Amendment.  Accordingly, an 
overview of the Court’s handiwork in this area precedes a specific 
focus on the “of and concerning” requirement. 
A. Libel’s Constitutional Framework  
Though often criticized for a lack of cohesion,11 the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of defamation has followed a discernible 
trajectory.  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court elevated 
defamation’s rank from a class of speech essentially invisible to 
the First Amendment to one squarely within its purview.12  The 
Sullivan Court declared that restrictions on libel did not enjoy 
“talismanic immunity” from constitutional scrutiny.13  From this 
premise, and the Court’s understanding of “the central meaning of 
the First Amendment,”14 flowed the rule that a public official  
 
9 See infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
10 See, e.g., Harris v. Zanone, 28 P. 845, 846–47 (Cal. 1892); Mix v. Woodward, 12 
Conn. 262, 286–87 (1837); Hardy v. Williamson, 12 S.E. 874, 876 (Ga. 1891). 
11 See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047, 
1056 (2006) (lamenting that defamation law “gives us the worst of worlds”); Sheldon 
W. Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at 
Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REV. 273, 276 (1990) (criticizing the “fragmented, confusing 
and unsatisfying array of criteria and requirements” of libel law); Joseph H. King, 
Whither the “Paths of Glory”: The Scope of the New York Times Rule in Defamation 
Claims by Former Public Officials and Candidates, 38 VT. L. REV. 275, 278 (2013) 
(“[T]he Court [should] simply cut through the complex doctrinal underbrush in the 
desultory inchoateness left in the wake of New York Times and its sequelae . . . .”); 
Joshua B. Orenstein, Comment, Absolute Privilege from Defamation Claims and the 
Devaluing of Teachers’ Professional Reputations, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 261, 267 (2005) 
(describing American defamation law as “a hodgepodge of complex and contradictory 
standards”); Mark P. Strasser, A Family Affair? Domestic Relations and Involuntary 
Public Figure Status, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 69, 70 (2013) (“The Court’s inability 
to adopt a coherent rationale combined with its unwillingness to apply the criteria 
that it has announced have made this area of the law chaotic.”). 
12 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964); cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257, 266 
(1952) (stating that libelous statements “are of such slight social value . . . that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality”). 
13 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269. 
14 Id. at 273. 
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could recover damages for a defamatory falsehood only upon 
demonstrating “actual malice”—that is, that the defendant either 
had knowledge that the defamatory statement concerning the 
plaintiff’s official conduct was false or recklessly disregarded 
whether it was false.15  Underscoring the stringency of this 
requirement, the Court compelled officials to establish actual 
malice with a “convincing clarity,” which appellate courts could 
pronounce absent from the record.16 
Sullivan launched a series of decisions that, for a time, 
steadily produced safeguards against libel laws whose stringency 
courted self-censorship not countenanced by the First 
Amendment.17  To bolster the actual malice standard’s difficult 
hurdle, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ efforts to meet the 
requirement through means that did not strictly conform to its 
definition.  Neither a motive of animosity toward the plaintiff18 nor 
failure to undertake the level of investigation that a reasonably 
prudent person would conduct19 qualified.  Further, the Court 
indulged a latitude of interpretation that allowed libel defendants 
to escape liability incurred by a literal or formal understanding of 
their words.  Thus, the specific circumstances under which 
accusations of “treason”20 and “blackmail”21 were made prompted 
the Court to treat them as rhetorical hyperbole rather than actual 
charges of law-breaking.  And in a major expansion of the actual 
malice standard, the Court extended this formidable evidentiary 
barrier to persons deemed public figures.22 
 
15 Id. at 279–80. 
16 Id. at 285–86. 
17 See id. at 279 (“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the 
truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to . . . self-censorship.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (“[T]o insure 
the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that 
the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.”). 
18 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1964). 
19 St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731–32. 
20 Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 
264, 285–86 (1974). 
21 Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). 
22 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring); 
see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and 
Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 275–78 (detailing alignments of separate opinions 
that forged this holding). During this period the Court also indicated that the “of and 
concerning” requirement is constitutionally mandated. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 
U.S. 75, 82–83 (1966); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288–92. See infra notes 36–47 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this development. 
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A decade after Sullivan, however, the Court began to trim the 
“strategic protection” afforded to defamatory falsehoods.23  In 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court rescinded its extension of the 
actual malice standard three years earlier to speech “involving 
matters of public or general concern.”24  Instead, the Court 
calibrated the level of a defendant’s intent that must be proved to 
the status of the plaintiff.  A plaintiff designated as a private figure 
would not be required to show actual malice in order to recover 
actual damages;25 such individuals were allowed to demonstrate 
that the defendant had acted negligently in publishing the 
falsehood.26  Only plaintiffs seeking presumed or punitive damages 
would have to establish that the defendant’s conduct amounted to 
actual malice.27  The Supreme Court heavily qualified this latter 
protection in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 
by confining the requirement to plaintiffs suing for libel involving 
a matter of public concern.28  Nor were private figure plaintiffs  
the sole beneficiaries of the Court’s heightened willingness to 
sanction state measures for protecting reputation.  Government 
could empower public officials and public figures suing media 
plaintiffs to investigate their editorial processes in search of 
evidence of actual malice.29 
Still, the Court also issued rulings with potential to thwart 
libel claims in several instances.  For example, defendants could 
obtain a summary judgment when a public figure’s opposing 
affidavit fails to support a reasonable inference of actual malice by 
clear and convincing evidence.30  Even defendants who survived 
this hurdle and proceeded to win a jury verdict could be defeated 
 
23 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 
24 See id. at 347–48; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (applying actual malice standard to all expression 
“involving matters of public or general concern”). 
25 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. 
26 Id. at 349. 
27 Id. 
28 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (Powell, 
J., plurality opinion). While unresolved over three decades later, Dun & Bradstreet 
also left open the possibility of still greater opportunities for private figures suing on 
speech not of public concern. Since Gertz was treated as a ruling governing libel 
involving a matter of public concern, id. at 756, it is debatable whether the Gertz’s 
requirement of fault applies to suits where the element of public concern is absent. 
See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:19 (2d ed. 2019); Ruth Walden & 
Derigan Silver, Deciphering Dun & Bradstreet: Does the First Amendment Matter in 
Private Figure-Private Concern Defamation Cases?, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2009). 
29 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175–76 (1979). 
30 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1986). 
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by independent appellate review of determinations of actual 
malice at trial.31  Further, though refusing to license wholesale 
changes to plaintiffs’ quoted statements, deliberate alteration of a 
plaintiff’s language would not constitute knowledge of falsity 
“unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning 
conveyed by the statement.”32  With similar nuance, the Court 
disavowed a categorical privilege for statements of opinion33 but 
approvingly noted earlier rulings protecting statements that did 
not “contain a provably false factual connotation” or that could not 
“reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts.”34  Moreover, 
at least in suits against media defendants for speech of public 
concern, private figures were held to bear the burden of 
demonstrating the falsity of the disputed assertion.35 
B. The Fundamentality of the “Of and Concerning” Requirement 
In a sense, the requirement that a defamatory statement be 
directed at the plaintiff is inherent in the constitutional structure 
described above and in the very concept of libel law.  After all, the 
Supreme Court’s various rules governing status, falsity, intent, 
and construction all assume plaintiffs seeking relief from the harm 
to their reputation caused by defendants’ statements about them.  
Indeed, the Court has seemingly conferred constitutional stature 
on the “of and concerning” requirement.  Moreover, given the 
doctrine’s long lineage and universal adoption, it would probably 
persist—though potentially in less potent form—even in the 
absence of constitutional prescription.  The necessity of satisfying 
the “of and concerning” requirement, as well as the basic outline 
 
31 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984). This 
review has proved invaluable to defendants in a large proportion of cases. See Susanna 
Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New Approaches in Australia, New Zealand, 
and England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101, 187 (2002) (“In trials where actual 
malice was at issue, the reversal rate of judgments for plaintiff was almost 70%.”); 
Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process 
in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1806 (1998) (referring to “high reversal rate 
of juries on the issue of actual malice”). 
32 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991). 
33 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990). Prior to Milkovich, 
courts had generally drawn a distinction under the First Amendment between 
statements of fact, which were actionable, and statements of opinion, which were not. 
See Ronald K. Chen, Once More into the Breach: Fact Versus Opinion Revisited After 
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 1 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 331, 351–65 (1991); 
Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Consensus: The Verifiability of Allegedly 
Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 43, 47–49 (1993). 
34 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (citation omitted). 
35 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986). 
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of this principle, appears settled.  Disputes continue in the grey 
area where defendants’ allegedly false statements do not plainly 
refer to the plaintiff. 
While the Supreme Court has not expressly endorsed the “of 
and concerning” requirement, the Court’s opinions in Sullivan and 
Rosenblatt v. Baer36 lend strong support to the requirement’s 
constitutional status.  Having already disposed of Sullivan’s suit 
for failure to show actual malice, the Court noted an additional 
deficiency in his claim.  The newspaper advertisement, over which 
Montgomery, Alabama, City Commissioner Sullivan sued, 
criticized the actions of the “police” for actions taken against civil 
rights demonstrators; Sullivan contended that readers would 
interpret the criticism and certain of its allegations as charging 
him with misconduct as supervisor of the police department.37  In 
the eyes of the Court, however, the statements in question did not 
“make even an oblique reference to [Sullivan] as an individual.”38  
Therefore, the evidence in the record was “incapable of supporting 
the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made 
‘of and concerning’ respondent.”39  The Court expressed special 
concern that a contrary ruling would “transmut[e] criticism of 
government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into 
personal criticism, and hence potential libel, of the officials of 
whom the government is composed.”40  Such alchemy, the  
Court suggested, was reminiscent of the discredited Sedition Act 
of 1798.41 
Similar considerations informed the outcome in Rosenblatt 
two years later.  There, a newspaper column raised questions 
about the performance of a later-disbanded commission on which 
the plaintiff had served.42  Though the plaintiff was not mentioned 
in the column, he argued that it would be perceived as charging 
him with mismanagement and peculation.43  Rejecting this theory, 
the Court invoked Sullivan for the proposition that, absent a 
demonstrable focus on the plaintiff, “an otherwise impersonal 
attack on governmental operations cannot be utilized to establish 
 
36 383 U.S. 75, 80 (1966). 
37 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 289. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 288. 
40 Id. at 292. 
41 See id. at 273–76. 
42 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 78–79 (1966). 
43 Id. at 79. 
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a libel of those administering the operations.”44  It is true that 
Sullivan and Rosenblatt could be construed as limited to the 
Court’s special solicitude for the core First Amendment values 
implicated by criticism of government.45  However, the two 
decisions have been generally viewed by both courts46 and 
commentators47 as more broadly constitutionalizing the “of and 
concerning” requirement. 
Whether as a product of this conclusion or not, the 
requirement has been virtually universally recognized as an 
essential component of a defamation cause of action.  The 
Restatement sets forth as the threshold element of a defamatory 
action “a false and defamatory statement concerning another.”48  
State supreme courts routinely affirm the principle that libel 
claims must be “of and concerning” the plaintiff.49  A review of 
decisions on this point reveals no deviation among courts on this 
principle other than occasional variation in the language used.50 
 
44 Id. at 80. 
45 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[T]he Court has frequently 
reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of 
First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.” (internal citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 
913 (1982) (“There is a ‘profound national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate 
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ” (quoting Sullivan, 
376 U.S. at 270)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“[T]here is practically 
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the  
free discussion of governmental affairs . . . of course includ(ing) discussions of 
candidates . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,  
218 (1966))). 
46 See, e.g., Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Haw. Teamsters & Allied Workers 
Union, Loc. 996, 302 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002); Emerito Estrada Rivera-Isuzu De 
P.R., Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 233 F.3d 24, 26–28 (1st Cir. 2000); Blatty 
v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Cal. 1986); QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
773 A.2d 906, 916 n.14 (Conn. 2001). 
47 See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 28 at § 4:40.50 (describing the requirement as “a 
rule of constitutional dimension”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion 
of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 428 n.351 (1989) (stating 
that in Sullivan the requirement was “elevated to the status of a constitutional 
requirement”); Julie J. Srochi, Note, Must Peaches Be Preserved at All Costs: 
Questioning the Constitutional Validity of Georgia’s Perishable Product 
Disparagement Law, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1223, 1231 n.62, 1232–33 (1996). 
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
49 See, e.g., Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 464 (Iowa 2013); Bouis v. Mueller, 
861 N.W.2d 620, 620–21 (Mich. 2015); Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News Inc., 
28 N.Y.3d 82, 84 (2016); Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 381–82 (Utah 2007); Schaecher 
v. Bouffault, 772 S.E.2d 589, 598 (Va. 2015). 
50 See, e.g., Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Cal. 1986) (referring to 
“specific reference requirement”); QSP, Inc., 773 A.2d at 916 (requiring that actionable 
“statement identified the . . . plaintiff[] to a reasonable third person”). 
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Additionally, consensus appears to exist on basic features  
of the requirement.  First, of course, the plaintiff need not be 
expressly named to satisfy the requirement.51  This principle is 
foundational because if only explicit references were actionable, it 
would obviate the need for inquiry into whether a statement is 
about the plaintiff.52  In determining whether libel refers to the 
plaintiff in the absence of such references, courts look to whether 
the statement would be reasonably understood by readers or 
listeners in light of all the circumstances.53  The relevant audience 
for this purpose is people who knew or knew of the plaintiff.54 
An often-pivotal aspect of the requirement is that the plaintiff 
bears a substantial burden to prove that the libelous expression 
was of and concerning the plaintiff.55  Affirming this principle, the 
New York Court of Appeals went on to conclude in Julian v. 
American Business Consultants, Inc. that “[t]he indispensable 
 
51 See, e.g., Bartholomew v. YouTube, LLC, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 917, 927 (Ct. App. 
2017); Wisner v. Nichols, 143 N.W. 1020, 1025 (Iowa 1913); Dijkstra v. Westerink, 401 
A.2d 1118, 1120 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc., 28 
N.Y.3d at 88 (Stein, J., dissenting); Nelson v. Am. Hometown Publ’g, Inc., 333 P.3d 
962, 969–70 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014); Main v. Royall, 348 S.W.3d 381, 395 (Tex.  
App. 2011). 
52 However, there would still remain some instances where a defendant could 
argue that the literal use of the plaintiff’s name was not intended to refer to the 
“actual” defendant. See infra note 164. 
53 See, e.g., Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1951) 
(“The issue was whether persons who knew or knew of the plaintiff could reasonably 
have understood the exhibited picture to refer to him.”); Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC, 
192 F. Supp. 3d 383, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he party alleging defamation must show 
that it is reasonable to conclude that the publication refers to him or her . . . .”), rev’d 
in part, 873 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (Ct. App. 
1979) (“The test is whether a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand 
that the fictional character therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as 
described.”), overruled on other grounds by McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 727 P.2d 711 (Cal. 
1986); Boardman & Cartwright v. Gazette Co., 281 N.W. 118, 120 (Iowa 1938) (“[I]t is 
not necessary to constitute a libel that the article name the person libeled, but it must 
by inference or innuendo at least refer in an [intelligible] way to the person libeled.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 & cmts. a, b, d. 
54 See, e.g., Dalbec v. Gentleman’s Companion, Inc., 828 F.2d 921, 925 (2d Cir. 
1987); Butowsky v. Folkenflik, No. 4:18CV442, 2019 WL 2518833, at *38 (E.D. Tex. 
Apr. 17, 2019), adopted by No. 4:18cv442, 2019 WL 3712026 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2019); 
Church of Scientology Int’l v. Time Warner, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992), aff’d sub nom. Church of Scientology Int’l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2001); 
Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 111 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex.  
App. 2003). 
55 See Kramer v. Skyhorse Publ’g, Inc., 45 Misc. 3d 315, 321 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 
2014) (“[T]he plaintiff has a heavy burden, even at the pleading stage, of establishing 
that the statement was actually about him.”). 
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proof is lacking.”56  Other courts have likewise underscored this 
evidentiary hurdle in the course of deciding that the plaintiff failed 
to show the necessary identification.57  In other instances, the 
weight of this burden has been demonstrated by the court’s 
skepticism rather than a formal pronouncement.  Two frequently 
cited cases, Clare v. Farrell58 and Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures,59 
illustrate this phenomenon.   
In Clare, the defendant had published a novel whose title 
character bore the name of the plaintiff and engaged in a number 
of “sordid experiences.”60  Like the plaintiff, the novel’s protagonist 
was a writer, and his physical appearance as described in the book 
purportedly matched that of the plaintiff.61  Notwithstanding this 
confluence of similarities, however, the district court granted 
summary judgment to the author and the publisher.62  Under the 
evidence required to show that the novel amounted to a portrayal 
of the plaintiff, “no jury could find otherwise.”63   
In Davis, the medium was film, but the plaintiff’s logic and its 
rejection by the court were the same.64  There, one of the movie’s 
principal characters shared the name of the plaintiff and pursued 
what might be viewed as a darker version of the plaintiff’s life.65  
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, emphasizing that the 
perception of a work describing the plaintiff must be “reasonable,” 
refused to upset the jury’s verdict for the studio.66  It is true that 
defendants in the two cases benefited from representing their 
work as fiction.  Still, the label of fiction does not always create 
immunity for the creator,67 and a less imposing standard of proof 
might have enabled at least one of these plaintiffs to recover.  
 
56 2 N.Y.2d 1, 18 (1956). 
57 See Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006); Fornshill v. 
Ruddy, 891 F. Supp. 1062, 1069–70 (D. Md. 1995); Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v. 
Penick, 219 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. App. 2007); Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 
723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). 
58 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947). 
59 191 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1951). 
60 Clare, 70 F. Supp. at 277. 
61 See id. at 276–77. 
62 Id. at 281. 
63 Id. at 278. 
64 Davis, 191 F.2d at 902. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. at 904–05. 
67 See infra Part III, discussing the problem of libel through fiction. 
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Though the burden of showing that a defamatory statement is 
“of and concerning” the plaintiff is “not a light one,”68 the 
enterprise is aided by the range of evidence that a plaintiff may 
introduce.  In particular, the plaintiff is not confined to the 
communication at issue in seeking to prove that it is about the 
plaintiff.  Rather, the plaintiff may present extrinsic facts  
showing that a reasonable reader or auditor would understand  
the expression in context as referring to the plaintiff.69  The 
admissibility of such evidence, however, is subject to a significant 
constraint:  the outside facts adduced must have been known to 
those who read or heard the communication.70  The Restatement 
provides: “Not only must the plaintiff prove the publication of the 
defamatory matter, but . . . he must satisfy the court that it was 
understandable as intended to refer to himself, and must convince 
the jury that it was so understood.”71  And indeed, courts have 
often stated that where an expression is reasonably understood to 
refer to the plaintiff, absence of intent does not relieve the 
defendant of liability.72 
At the same time, however, courts, when rejecting claims for 
lack of reference to the plaintiff, have often highlighted evidence 
that the defendant did not mean to describe the plaintiff.73  
Moreover, First Amendment doctrine raises doubt as to whether a 
regime of strict liability on this point would pass constitutional 
muster.  Perhaps for that reason, courts often note a defendant’s 
negligence in failing to realize that its defamatory depiction could 
 
68 Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
69 See, e.g., Dorn v. Astra USA, 975 F. Supp. 388, 396 (D. Mass. 1997); Gales v. 
CBS Broad., Inc., No. Civ.A.5:03-CV-35(BR), 2004 WL 1961680, at *9 (S.D. Miss. July 
9, 2004); Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 464–65 (Iowa 2013); New England 
Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 480 N.E.2d 1005, 1011 
(Mass. 1985); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 738 (Va. 1985). 
70 See, e.g., Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir. 
1998); Chicherchia v. Cleary, 207 A.D.2d 855, 856 (2d Dep’t 1994); Berry v. Safer, 293 
F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (S.D. Miss. 2003). 
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. d  (emphasis added). 
72 See, e.g., Weinstein v. Bullick, 827 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Zerpol 
Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404, 410–11 (E.D. Pa. 1983); New England 
Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc., 480 N.E.2d at 1009–10; Cheatum v. Wehle, 5 
N.Y.2d 585, 594 (1959); Marr v. Putnam, 246 P.2d 509, 521 (Or. 1952). 
73 See, e.g., Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 278 (D. Minn. 1947); Ellis v. Safety 
Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d 979, 984 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 361–62 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1954); Vice v. Kasprzak, 318 S.W.3d 
1, 13 (Tex. App. 2009). 
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be reasonably understood as referring to the plaintiff.74  At a 
minimum, it is difficult to reconcile strict liability with the 
demanding evidentiary requirements of actual malice where that 
standard applies.75 
II. MAKING PLAINTIFF IDENTIFICATION—MAINLY—A  
MATTER FOR JUDGES 
For reasons discussed below, courts should be afforded more 
authority to determine whether plaintiffs have presented 
sufficient evidence that a defamatory statement is about them to 
proceed to trial.  This shift in allocation of responsibilities could be 
accomplished in a number of ways.  A straightforward means, 
though perhaps unrealistically novel, would be to remove the 
question from juries altogether and assign it to courts—at least 
under state law.76  A less dramatic change, though still 
substantial, would be to ratchet up the standard for establishing 
this element of a defamation claim to “clear and convincing 
evidence.”  With that obstacle confronting plaintiffs, courts would 
more frequently dismiss on the pleadings or at summary judgment 
claims presenting this issue.77  Or in a similar vein, but perhaps 
more palatable—as suggested earlier—the most effective means of 
greater judicial screening of dubious claims of identity may  
be simply to require that defamatory statements clearly refer to  
a plaintiff.   
Admittedly, these proposals are probably unattainable 
without statutory enactment.  Even under existing law, however, 
courts have more latitude than is often recognized or exercised to 
reject claims involving plaintiff identity before they reach the jury.  
In particular, a more robust examination of evidence presented at 
summary judgment could spare the costs of a trial and possible 
 
74 See, e.g., Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 128 (1st Cir. 2006); Godbout v. 
Cousens, 485 N.E.2d 940, 946 (Mass. 1985); Downey v. Chutehall Constr. Co., 19 
N.E.3d 470, 476 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014); Nelson v. Am. Hometown Publ’g, Inc., 333 P.3d 
962, 970 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014). 
75 See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text. 
76 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 867–68 (2010) (Stevens,  
J., dissenting). 
77 This impact could be limited by courts’ reluctance to grant summary judgment 
where credibility is at issue. However, the value of witness testimony in this context 
is generally insubstantial. See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
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reversal on appeal arising from inadequate claims.78  While a 
complaint advances a one-sided perspective, summary judgment 
gives the court the opportunity to consider the evidence and the 
arguments of both sides.  In this setting, it is especially important 
that parties can introduce at this stage any evidence that would 
be admissible at trial.79  Thus, for example, parties can offer 
affidavits supporting or contradicting the plaintiff’s assertion that 
the defamatory material referred to the plaintiff.80  
It is true that dismissal of a case on this ground at summary 
judgment precludes jurors’ evaluation of witnesses, but in general 
this assessment seems to add little benefit anyway—especially if 
the plaintiff’s intent is not part of the equation.81  Even with 
respect to reasonable perception of the defendant’s expression, the 
utility of witnesses is doubtful.  As a practical matter, it seems 
doubtful in most cases that a sufficient sampling of witnesses can 
be gathered to gauge the perspective of the average reader.  
Assuming, though, that a satisfactory threshold can sometimes  
be met, their probative value is questionable.  Jurors would 
presumably watch dueling processions of witnesses cherry-picked 
by each side to support its contention that the communication at 
issue was or was not about the plaintiff.82  Survey evidence of the 
writing’s audience, collected by a special master and submitted to 
the court, would bypass these tendentious witnesses.  Of course, 
cases can arise in which live testimony will possibly shed light on 
whether the defendant’s statement refers to the plaintiff.  
However, courts should forego summary judgment on this issue 
only where this is manifestly the case. 
More vigorous judicial evaluation of plaintiff identity does not 
drastically invade jury prerogative in another sense as well.   
The Supreme Court has displayed a willingness to rule on  
what constitutes reasonable perception where constitutional 
 
78 But see John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
522, 522 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment, on balance, increases costs, 
inefficiency, and unfairness of the civil justice system). 
79 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510(e); OHIO R. CIV. P. 56(E); 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f). 
80 In the setting of administrative law, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
submission of documents rather than a live hearing may often suffice as a basis for 
taking away a person’s property interest. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
332–35, 344–46 (1976). 
81 See infra notes 229–242 and accompanying text. 
82 For a skeptical view of the value of deciding credibility by presenting live 
witness testimony to juries, see Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 837–51 (2011). 
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guarantees are at stake.  A notable example can be found in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  There, the Court has 
sometimes weighed whether a government practice or gesture can 
be reasonably viewed as endorsing or supporting religion.83  In 
these instances, the Court has not been deterred by consciousness 
that its constitutional ruling is rooted in its evaluation of the 
facts.84  Similarly, the Court has exercised independent judgment 
in determining what constitutes a citizen’s reasonable, subjective 
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in various 
scenarios.85  Granted these analogies are imperfect in that they do 
not purport to gauge the actual views of specific audiences.  
Nevertheless, it is already implicit in present doctrine—which 
permits courts to determine what an audience cannot reasonably 
conclude—that courts have the capacity to judge the reactions of 
auditors and readers. 
While the approach proposed here would presumably subject 
fewer defendants to trial on the issue of plaintiff identity, it would 
not invariably operate as a one-way ratchet.  On the contrary, 
there could also be suits in which a libel suit raising multiple 
issues—for example, public figure status—could be pruned of 
tenuous defendant assertions about identity before the case 
reached the jury.  Unless the “of and concerning” issue is 
inextricably intertwined with other questions, jurors would 
benefit from the ability to focus on essential questions before them.  
Achieving this result does not call for major institutional change.  
Courts need only seriously scrutinize the evidence presented and 
settle a resolvable issue rather than abdicate this determination 
to the jury. 
Still, it must be acknowledged that the principal impetus for 
the proposal is adequate protection of free speech.  The elaborate 
body of First Amendment doctrine governing libel represents the 
Court’s effort to balance the right of free expression with the 
state’s interest in protecting individual reputation from false 
 
83 See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866, 869 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 
616, 620 (1989), abrogated in part by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565,  
578–81 (2014). 
84 See Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693–94 
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
85 Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018); Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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charges.86  The result is a distinctive hybrid of tort law and speech 
regulation.  Though the state’s power to award damages “reflects 
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth 
of every human being,”87 that interest does not apply to instances 
in which the defendant has not accused the plaintiff of anything.   
With respect to ascertaining plaintiff identity, two dangers 
stand out from inferring too readily that speech not purporting to 
be about the plaintiff actually refers to that person.  First, 
especially in the realm of fiction, a speaker may be deterred by the 
specter of unwittingly portraying repugnant conduct by someone 
whose description matches the plaintiff.  As the court observed in 
Clare v. Farrell, “It would have been a practical impossibility  
for the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care to have 
discovered the existence of the plaintiff.”88  Though Clare was 
decided before the advent of the internet, its essential rationale 
stands:  writers and other speakers should not be held responsible 
for exhausting every possibility that their words could apply to an 
unknown person.89  
In addition, given the complexity of defamation doctrine, even 
to many trained in law, the “of and concerning” requirement  
may be especially susceptible to misapplication by juries.  With 
elements of libel actions like negligence and actual malice, jurors 
render an assessment of the defendant’s state of mind when 
committing the defamatory falsehood.  Determining levels of 
intent is by no means a simple task, but it falls squarely within 
the traditional province of juries.90  Likewise, if it is established 
that the defendant’s statement does refer to the plaintiff, as is 
self-evident in most cases, juries are competent to evaluate the 
statement’s truth or falsity.  Where the putative reference is not 
clear, though, determining its presence partakes more of textual 
interpretation that courts are accustomed to making and less 
 
86 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1990); Phila. 
Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.  
448, 456 (1976). 
87 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
88 70 F. Supp. 276, 279 (D. Minn. 1947). 
89 See Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 205 Misc. 357, 360–61 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 
1954) (“To make such accidental or coincidental use of a name a libel would impose a 
prohibitive burden upon authors . . . .”) (rejecting claim arising from fictional 
television crime program). 
90 See, e.g., 40A AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 450 (2019) (“The question of intent with 
which a homicidal act was committed is ordinarily deemed to be a question for the 
determination of the jury.”). 
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deciding concrete facts.  Thus, this exercise appears to resemble 
judicial functions like statutory construction and fixing the 
meaning of a contract term91 more than reaching a verdict on 
whether a defendant ran a red light or accepted a bribe.92 
Further, excessive reluctance to dismiss a libel claim before 
trial when the heavy burden of showing a statement’s reference to 
the plaintiff cannot be met creates a problem of reviewability.  
Deferring the question of plaintiff identity to the jury may enable 
it to mistakenly find that speech refers to the plaintiff without 
realistic opportunity to correct the error.  Except where the jury 
has reached an emphatically irrational conclusion, courts are 
reluctant in motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 
on appeal to upset what is designated a factual conclusion.93  
Moreover, this problem is compounded by the secrecy of jury 
deliberations and the nature of general verdicts.  Except in the 
unusual case of special interrogatories,94 a jury verdict does not 
reflect the particular determinations made in reaching the  
 
 
91 See L.P.P.R., Inc. v. Keller Crescent Corp., 532 F. App’x 268, 273–75 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“[T]here is no role for the jury to play in contract interpretation when there is 
no ambiguity.”); Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 402 P.2d 839, 842–43 (Cal. 1965) 
(“[U]nless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence,” 
interpretation of a contract is purely a “judicial function”).  
92 Much of this same reasoning could be brought to bear on the question of 
whether a libel defendant’s statement was an actual fact rather than merely the 
defendant’s view. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. Indeed, the two 
issues may be seen as overlapping where parties dispute whether defendants’ 
expression actually portrayed plaintiffs or only fanciful versions of them. This 
similarity in considerations may help to explain why courts so often rule at summary 
judgment or on appeal that the defendant did not assert a provably false fact. See, e.g., 
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps./Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. BUCI Television, Inc., 118 F. 
Supp. 2d 126, 130 (D. Mass. 2000); Romero v. Thomson Newspapers (Wis.), Inc., 648 
So. 2d 866, 870 (La. 1995); Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 612 N.E.2d 1158, 1163, 
1165 (Mass. 1993). Nevertheless, as a relative matter, it is safer to entrust juries with 
deciding whether a communication can be reasonably understood as hurling factual 
charges at the plaintiff than with whether they were aimed at the plaintiff in the first 
place. For the reasons discussed above, courts are better equipped to assess questions 
of plaintiff identity. On the other hand, once it is settled that a statement refers to the 
defendant, jurors can draw on their own experiences and perceptions to decide 
whether it should be read as containing a provably false assertion. 
93 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 4 N.Y. 
JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 529 (2019). 
94 See Foster v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 131 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1942) 
(noting that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 49 authorizing special 
interrogatories is “seldom used”). 
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decision.95  Thus, unsupportable logic employed to infer that a 
defamatory falsehood was of and concerning the plaintiff may be 
cloaked by a verdict reflecting multiple bases for liability. 
Even in cases where jury competence on this issue is high, 
probing judicial scrutiny of plaintiff identity can serve the goal of 
judicial economy.  Libel suits sharply increased several decades 
ago and have not significantly decreased in volume.96  Measures 
that streamline these suits supply welcome relief to this burden 
on the courts.  Where disputed speech cannot plausibly be viewed 
as referring to the plaintiff, the time and costs of trial should  
be avoided.  Again, it bears emphasizing that more robust 
enforcement of the “of and concerning” requirement would not 
generally stifle libel claims—the great majority of which hinge on 
other issues.97 
And of course, even where this issue does arise, heightened 
scrutiny does not inevitably spell defeat for plaintiffs.  Two leading 
cases illustrate that, even in the realm of fiction, plaintiffs can 
make a powerful prima facie case that a work can reasonably be 
viewed as portraying them.98  In Geisler v. Petrocelli, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to dismiss Geisler’s suit over 
Petrocelli’s “potboiler . . . concerning the odyssey of a female 
transsexual athlete through the . . . corrupting world of the 
women’s professional tennis circuit.”99  The main character, who 
participated in a tennis fraud and engaged in graphically 
described “untoward” sex, had Geisler’s exact name and  
allegedly bore Geisler’s physical appearance.100  Nor could  
the resemblance—more substantial than that in Clare v.  
Farrell101—convincingly be chalked up to coincidence; Geisler and 
Petrocelli had become acquainted while working at the same small 
publishing firm for six months.102 
 
95 See Nollenberger v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Cal. 
1963) (“[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 49] is designed to take some of the 
mystery out of general verdicts where, in case after case, neither counsel for either 
side nor the Court have been able to reconcile the verdict with the evidence.”). 
96 See Pamela C. Laucella & Barbara Osborne, Libel and College Coaches, 12 J. 
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 183, 188 (2002). 
97 See Daniel Smirlock, Note, “Clear and Convincing” Libel: Fiction and the Law 
of Defamation, 92 YALE L.J. 520, 529 (1983). 
98 See infra Part III for a discussion of the possibility of libel through fiction. 
99 616 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1980). 
100 Id. 
101 See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
102 Geisler, 616 F.2d at 638. 
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In Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the Second Circuit allowed 
a suit to proceed over a novel written by the plaintiff’s brother.103  
Unlike in Geisler, the defendant did not appropriate the plaintiff’s 
name for the chief character.  The story’s alleged resemblance to 
the plaintiff’s life, however—aside from the character’s 
opprobrious conduct—was striking if not comprehensive.  Like the 
plaintiff, the main character was the eldest child and twenty-three 
years old in 1938, was Latvian, and looked after the family.104  The 
composition of the family, whose travels the novel depicts, 
matched the Fetlers down to the number of children—thirteen—
as well as the precise distribution of its girls and boys.105  Like the 
Fetlers, too, the fictional family bought a home in Stockholm.106  In 
both families, the father was a Russian Protestant minister who 
brought the family around Europe in an old bus to perform 
concerts as a band and choir.107  While such details did not prove 
that the book libeled the plaintiff, it is hard to fault the court for 
permitting a jury to weigh that question.108 
These exceptional instances, however, do not remove the need 
to dismiss unconvincing assertions of plaintiff identity to protect 
core First Amendment values.  That need is especially pronounced 
with respect to media coverage of current events.  A central 
purpose of the First Amendment was to preserve free public 
discussion of matters of public concern.109  In one of the principal 
arenas of “of and concerning” issues, the general bar to suits based 
on libel of large groups,110 courts have recognized the rule’s 
advancement of this aim.111  Some have particularly emphasized 
 
103 364 F.2d 650, 650 (2d Cir. 1966). 




108 This discussion of Geisler and Fetler assumes, as current law permits, that 
fiction can be a vehicle for defamation. See infra notes 169–171 and accompanying 
text for an argument to the contrary. 
109 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 
214, 218–19 (1966); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 391–92 (1962); Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940).  
110 See infra Part IV. 
111 See, e.g., Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893, 900 
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (stating that suits by members of large groups could “seriously 
interfere with public discussion of issues, or groups, which are in the public eye” and 
“result in the public receiving less information about topics of general concern”), aff’d, 
665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1981); Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10–CV–05022–LHK, 
2011 WL 2441898, at *6 (N.D. Ca. June 15, 2011) (“The rationale for [the group libel] 
rule is to protect freedom of public discussion . . . .”); Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. 
2019] GUESS WHO? 937 
the vital role of journalists in promoting this discussion.112  Suits 
based on group libel of political organizations, where interests  
at the heart of the First Amendment are at stake, should  
trigger special vigilance.  Charges against such organizations have 
sometimes provoked suits by a prominent member.113  At the same 
time, courts should also take care that general references to actors 
in matters of public concern outside the political sphere—from 
whatever source—are not subject to overly facile translations into 
individual charges.114 
Courts have displayed varying sensitivity to their duty to 
screen suits against news providers for inadequate evidence of 
plaintiff identity.  In Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., the 
court recognized that a coincidence of names and similarity of 
circumstances did not automatically qualify a libel claim for 
trial.115  Agreeing to substitute fictitious names, the defendant’s 
 
CBS News Inc.,132 A.D.3d 82, 93 n.2 (1st Dep’t 2015) (“[The group libel rule is 
designed] to ‘encourage frank discussions of matters of public concern under the First 
Amendment guarantees.’ ” (quoting Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 
226, 229 (2d Dep’t 1981))), aff’d, 28 N.Y.S.3d 82 (2016). 
112 See, e.g., PetRays Veterinary Radiology Consultants v. DVM Insight, Inc., No. 
D062821, 2013 WL 6628083, at *11 (Dec. 16, 2013); Schuster v. U.S. News & World 
Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting libel claim by member of 
group in light of the “importance of journalistic freedom in investigating and reporting 
on matters of public interest” under the First Amendment); Barger v. Playboy Enters., 
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (stating that the group libel rule 
“safeguards freedom of speech by effecting a sound compromise between . . . the 
societal interest in free press discussions of matters of general concern, and . . . the 
individual interest in reputation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), 
aff’d, 732 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1984). 
113 See, e.g., Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 933 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2019) (suit by 
former vice presidential candidate arising from editorial criticizing her political action 
committee); Schonek v. WJAC, Inc., 258 A.2d 504, 506–07 (Pa. 1969) (suit by a leader 
of group financing committee charged with “pilfering” and “doctoring” campaign 
document). 
114 See, e.g., Golden North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publ’g Co., 218 F.2d 612,  
615–16, 622 (9th Cir. 1954) (dismissing complaint by air carrier based on newspaper 
editorial critical of all non-scheduled air carriers); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. 
Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 380–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting summary judgment to 
defendants nutritionist and physician to remarks in newspaper and magazine 
asserting that some in industry were “quacks” or practiced “quackery”); Julian v. Am. 
Bus. Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 11–12 (1956) (dismissing complaint by plaintiff 
over a book’s report that he attended two meetings by Communist front organizations 
seven years apart where the book used caustic language to describe broadly those who 
were exploited by such organizations); Worldnet Software Co. v. Gannett Satellite 
Info. Network, Inc., 702 N.E.2d 149, 152–54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (dismissing claims 
based on alleged defamatory statements about a software company, made in 
newspaper and on television, brought by operator of company). 
115 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273–74 (S.D. Ohio 1975). 
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newspaper obtained the consent of a woman and her son to report 
on their experiences arising from the son’s drug addiction and 
mental problems.116  After the plaintiffs informed the newspaper 
that the names chosen and problems faced matched their own, the 
newspaper reiterated in headline form the original story’s 
highlighted statement that the names were fictitious.117  Finding 
these measures ensured that “no reasonable person could have 
reasonably believed that the article pointed to the plaintiff,” the 
court granted summary judgment for the defendant.118 
More problematic in its approach was the decision in Hudson 
v. Guy Gannett Broadcasting Co.119  Overturning the lower court, 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine denied summary judgment 
to the defendant over its broadcast of a report that a mill had 
terminated twelve employees—none of whom were named—for 
involvement with illegal drugs.120  Although the plaintiff was one 
of the twelve fired employees, he was actually dismissed for 
alleged alcohol abuse rather than drug-related involvement like 
the other eleven.121  A coworker averred that his learning the day 
after the report aired that Hudson had been among those 
terminated caused the coworker to believe that Hudson had been 
dismissed over illegal drugs.122  This affidavit—coupled with 
Hudson’s allegation that others in the community had gained this 
same impression—was found sufficient to allow the suit to go 
forward.123  Though the existence of such a perception may have 
been plausible, the threshold permitted to establish it is troubling.  
A single affidavit supported by a plaintiff’s self-serving declaration 
obviously does not satisfy the heavy burden124 for meeting the “of 
and concerning” requirement where the plaintiff has not been 
named.  Such logic opens the door to authorization of trials based 
on skimpy and biased evidence that third parties have connected 
the dots between an unspecific news report and the plaintiff.125 
 
116 Id. at 1272. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1274. 
119 521 A.2d 714 (Me. 1987). 
120 Id. at 714. 
121 Id. at 715. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 716–17, 718. 
124 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
125 By contrast, the denial of summary judgment to the defendant in Nelson v. 
Am. Hometown Publ’g, Inc., 333 P.3d 962, 966 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014), rested on a 
direct link to the plaintiff that yielded demonstrable harm. A list of sex offenders 
published by the defendant newspaper had incorrectly placed the plaintiffs’ address 
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Television news is especially susceptible to unforeseen claims 
that it has defamed the plaintiff, because the accompaniment of 
words by images can create unforeseen alleged associations.  In 
particular, plaintiffs may perceive a broadcast as tying them to a 
broadcast’s report of offensive or shameful behavior.  In Sims v. 
Kiro, Inc., the court recognized the danger of permitting a claim to 
proceed on the basis of too speculative a link.126  A television 
newscast disparaging bicentennial merchandise on sale at the 
Seattle Center had included closeup shots of merchandise on 
display in the plaintiff’s store.127  These shots did not  
picture either the plaintiff or his shop.128  Affirming summary 
judgment dismissal below, the court observed that under these 
circumstances “the scales must be tilted in favor of the need of free 
speech.”129  Though the plaintiff belonged to the group of  
sellers being depicted, he could not persuasively claim that the 
broadcast’s description had singled him out.130 
Conversely, the rejection of the defendant’s summary 
judgment motion in Clark v. American Broadcasting Companies, 
Inc. illustrates the dangers to broadcasters if they fail to 
painstakingly consider all potential implications of each image 
presented.131  In Clark, the program focused on the effect of street 
prostitution on a middle-class neighborhood, and several women 
were shown as they walked down the street.132  As the plaintiff 
appeared, the narrator stated that “for black women whose homes 
were [in the neighborhood], the cruising white customers were an 
especially humiliating experience.”133  Shortly afterward, a black 
female resident of the neighborhood stated on camera: “Almost 
any woman who was black and on the street was considered to  
be a prostitute herself.  And was treated like a prostitute.”134  
Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that it was for 
a jury to decide whether the plaintiff’s appearance cast her as a 
 
next to one of the offenders. Id. at 965. According to the allegations, this error led to 
the plaintiffs’ harassment and intimidation and to gunshots being fired near their 
home. Id. at 965–66. 
126 580 P.2d 642, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978). 
127 Id. at 644. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 646. 
130 Id. 
131 684 F.2d 1208, 1214 (6th Cir. 1982), disapproved on other grounds, Bichler v. 
Union Bank & Tr. Co. of Grand Rapids, 745 F.2d 1006, 1012 (6th Cir. 1984). 
132 Id. at 1210–11. 
133 Id. at 1211. 
134 Id. 
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neighborhood resident or as a prostitute.135  The ruling is 
understandable in light of the consequences the plaintiff said she 
suffered136 and the larger backdrop of racism137 from which this 
episode arose.  However, the district court’s ruling was at least 
defensible because the plaintiff appeared after the story’s focus 
had shifted from the presence of street prostitutes to their effects; 
the court had grounds for finding that her appearance could only 
be reasonably understood as one of the black middle-class women 
who had been approached by white customers.138  Regardless, 
courts should be cautious about extrapolating a holding like this 
beyond its distinctive circumstances.  Otherwise, producers of 
television and other visual media may unduly rein in coverage lest 
a jury ultimately find that a combination of words and image 
produced an unintended calumny.139 
This is not to suggest, of course, that solicitude for press 
freedom should prompt courts to force plaintiffs to dispel all doubt 
as to whether the speech at issue can be reasonably viewed as 
referring to the plaintiff.  Where plaintiffs have met the heavy, but 
 
135 Id. at 1214. 
136 Id. at 1211. Plaintiff testified that, among other things, members of her church 
had shunned her and two potential employers declined to hire her out of fear that her 
presence would damage their businesses. Id. 
137 See Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, 
Sexual Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
541, 545–48 (1996) (discussing racial implications of Clark). 
138 See Clark, 684 F.2d at 1223 (Brown, J., dissenting). 
139 Of course, media not presenting moving images can also encounter their own 
version of this problem. The issue of permissible inferences from the juxtaposition of 
word and picture in newspaper journalism is as old as Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 
185 (1909), and as contemporary as Cheney v. Daily News L.P., 654 F. App’x 578 (3d 
Cir. 2016). In Peck, the Court overturned a directed verdict against a woman who sued 
over the appearance of her photograph in a newspaper advertisement. 214 U.S. at 
188–90. The advertisement consisted of an endorsement by a “Mrs. A. Schuman” of 
the salutary effects of malt whiskey. Id. Justice Holmes’s opinion stated that “[o]f 
course” the insertion of Peck’s picture in place of Mrs. Schuman’s conveyed that Peck 
had offered the testimonial. Id. In Cheney, a newspaper published on its website an 
article about a sex scandal at the Philadelphia Fire Department. 654 F. App’x at 580. 
Next to the article appeared a photograph of the plaintiff captioned “Philadelphia 
firefighter Francis Cheney holds a flag at a 9/11 ceremony in 2006.” Id. The Third 
Circuit ruled that a reader might reasonably conclude from the photograph’s presence 
beside the article that Cheney was one of the firefighters implicated in the scandal. 
Id. at 581; see also Prince v. Out Publ’g Inc., No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999, at *5 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002) (dismissing a claim based on photographs of plaintiff in an 
article about partying, allegedly featuring unsafe sex and illegal drug use, on the 
grounds that while plaintiff’s likeness in photographs was “of and concerning” him in 
truthfully indicating his presence at a party and his sexual orientation, it was not “of 
and concerning” him with respect to article’s references to unsafe sex and drug use). 
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not insuperable, burden of showing that such an interpretation is 
plausible, they should be permitted to pursue an otherwise 
actionable claim.  For example, close similarity between the name 
and nature of a plaintiff’s business and those of the company 
reported on can sometimes furnish a basis for sending a case  
to trial.  On a segment on “scams” purportedly run by some 
sweepstakes companies, a television news magazine conceived of 
a presumably fictional company called “Sweepstakes Clearing 
House.”140  In fact, however, the plaintiff for years had been 
conducting a concededly legitimate sweepstakes contest called 
“Sweepstakes Clearinghouse” strongly resembling the “con” 
version depicted in the story.141  The court concluded that  
viewers could reasonably perceive the segment as reporting  
that Sweepstakes Clearinghouse had engaged in a sweepstakes 
scam.142   
Similarly, a newspaper in New England Tractor-Trailer 
Training of Connecticut, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co. published a 
series of articles sharply critical of the “New England 
Tractor-Trailer School.”143  Though the newspaper argued that its 
charges had been directed at New England Tractor-Trailer 
School-Massachusetts, plaintiff New England Tractor-Trailer 
School-Connecticut contended that readers would understand the 
charges to apply to its own operation.144  The court authorized  
a trial to determine whether such an understanding was 
reasonable.145   
 
140 Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 111 S.W.3d 168, 171–72 
(Tex. App. 2003). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 176. 
143 New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 480 
N.E.2d 1005, 1006 (Mass. 1985). Among the accusations leveled against the school 
were that the school’s trucks were “decrepit, sometimes unsafe; [the school’s 
president] made a number of demonstrably false statements . . . about the school; and 
that the school’s contracts with its students violate[d] the laws of at least two states.” 
Id. at 1006–07 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
144 Id. at 1007. 
145 Id. at 1011. If the jury were to reach this conclusion, it would then decide 
whether the newspaper had been negligent in failing to recognize that the articles 
would be viewed in this light. Id. at 1012. The case is distinguishable from Nelle v. 
WHO Television, LLC, 342 F. Supp. 3d 879 (S.D. Iowa 2018). There, the court granted 
summary judgment for the defendant where the Nebraska plaintiff roofing company 
had sued over alleged defamation concerning an Iowa company that had a partly 
overlapping name but which the disputed broadcast had portrayed as operating 
entirely within an Iowa city. Id. at 901. 
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Similar logic can be applied to suits by corporation presidents 
where the defendant’s own statements have highlighted the 
president’s dominant role.  In Winn v. United Press International, 
the United Press International (“UPI”) published an article 
alleging fraudulent and other improper activity by a corporation 
that produced beauty pageants.146  The UPI rebutted the 
corporation's president’s claim that the article defamed her by 
noting that the accusatory statements did not mention her by 
name and related only to the alleged practices of her 
corporation.147  Such a narrow reading, countered the court, was 
acontextual and ignored three explicit references to the plaintiff in 
other parts of the article.  In two parts, the plaintiff was reported 
as “denying all charges.”148  Moreover, the article described the 
plaintiff as the pageant’s “director” and “executive director” while 
not mentioning any other employee of the corporation.149  Taken 
as a whole, then, the article could be reasonably interpreted to 
refer to her.150   
Similarly, in Hoffman v. Roberto, the former president of a 
trucking company that had entered into bankruptcy proceedings 
brought suit over a telex sent by the union’s leadership 
summarizing the bankruptcy court’s reasons for appointing a 
trustee for the company.151  The telex charged the company, 
though not Hoffman himself, with what could be considered 
improprieties.152  Denying summary judgment for the defendants, 
the court determined that the telex’s audience—union locals 
familiar with the company—might attribute responsibility for the 
alleged actions to the plaintiff.153 
In cases like these, the real possibility of reader or viewer 
identification is almost intuitively apparent; in other instances, 
however, suits over coverage of business activities have gone to 
trial on more attenuated connections to plaintiffs.  In Eyal v. Helen 
 
146 938 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.D.C. 1996). 
147 Id. at 43. 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 44. 
150 Id. The court went on to grant summary judgment for the defendants on the 
ground that the UPI had not committed negligence in reporting these charges. Id.  
at 45–46. 
151 85 B.R. 406, 408 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
152 Id. at 409. The court found that three of the statements cited by the plaintiff 
were susceptible to a defamatory interpretation. Id. at 411. 
153 Id. at 411–12. In addition, the court permitted the plaintiff to invoke group 
libel theory because the company’s management—viewed as collectively accused of 
misconduct—was relatively small. Id. at 412.  
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Broadcasting Corp., the defendant radio station reported: “The 
owner of a Brookline [d]elicatessen and seven other people are 
arrested in connection with an international cocaine ring.”154  
Though the report did not mention the plaintiff by name, he 
contended as owner of Haim’s Deli that many listeners would infer 
that he was operating the business as a front for cocaine dealers.155  
Applying what it deemed the “objective standard” of New England 
Tractor-Trailer, the court held that Eyal’s allegations potentially 
showed that the station should have realized that listeners would 
piece together its report with those from other sources to infer that 
the report referred to Eyal.156  The court did emphasize the 
modesty of the plaintiff’s burden at this early stage of the suit.  
Both the complaint’s allegations and reasonable inferences from it 
in Eyal’s favor were presumed true, and his complaint would be 
sufficient “unless it appears beyond doubt that [Eyal] can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.”157  Though a correct articulation of law at the time, these 
propositions as applied here stand in some tension to libel 
plaintiffs’ supposedly weighty burden to demonstrate that 
falsehoods are “of and concerning” them.  This approach invites 
plaintiffs to craft tendentious and expansive allegations to stave 
off dismissal.  That the defendant has another opportunity to 
prevail at summary judgment does not entirely remove the 
incentive caused by permissive theories of plaintiff identity.  The 
ability of plaintiffs simply to prolong the suit provides leverage to  
 
 
154 583 N.E. 2d 228, 229 (Mass. 1991) (alteration in original). 
155 Id. at 230–31. 
156 See id. at 231. 
157 Id. at 230 (citations omitted). The logic of ascribing alleged company 
misconduct to its president can be adapted to areas where a course of treatment has 
been prominently identified with its chief proponent. In Theodosakis v. Clegg, the 
defendants issued a high-profile report containing allegedly false statements 
criticizing a popular recommendation for treating arthritis with certain 
over-the-counter nutritional supplements. No. CV-14-02445-TUC-JAS (BPV), 2017 
WL 1294529, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2017). The recommendation had been included 
in a number-one best-selling book by the plaintiff as part of a nine-step treatment 
program. Id. The plaintiff argued that the report was “of and concerning” him because 
his “name was virtually synonymous with” the supplements in question. Id. at *12. 
Surviving a motion to dismiss, the complaint was ruled sufficiently pled to support a 
theory that the plaintiff was so closely linked in the public mind with the use of these 
supplements that the allegedly false statements impeached his personal reputation. 
Id. at *13. Permitting the plaintiff to proceed at this stage does not seem troubling in 
light of the level of evidence he would presumably need to marshal to prevail at 
summary judgment. 
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extract a favorable settlement.  That leverage increases as the 
prospect of decision by a jury—perhaps influenced by hindsight 
and sympathy for the plaintiff’s distress—looms larger. 
Moreover, the standard applied by the Eyal court—sustaining 
a complaint unless “ ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief’ ”158—recited a Supreme Court passage the Court 
itself later disavowed.  In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the 
Court rejected this approach because it would permit “a wholly 
conclusory statement of claim . . . whenever the pleadings left 
open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set 
of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.”159  Accordingly, the 
Court emphasized that courts “are not bound to accept as true a 
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”160  Instead, the 
Court would assess a complaint by its “plausibility.”161  Under this 
more stringent criterion, the Court would require plaintiffs to 
plead sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of” the alleged misconduct at 
issue.162  Elaborating on this standard two years later, the Court 
underscored the increased scrutiny applied to complaints.  
Determining their sufficiency was to be a “context-specific task 
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience 
and common sense.”163  Thus, claims that a plaintiff unmentioned 
by the defendant is the target of libel should not be upheld on the 
mere possibility that evidence may later be amassed in support of 
the putative link.  Rather, courts should searchingly apply their 
“experience and common sense” to a complaint’s assertions to 
realistically decide whether the claim is truly “plausible.” 
III. LIBEL THROUGH FICTION 
Alleged defamation through works of fiction has proved a 
fertile and vexing source of suits against authors and other 
creators.  The very notion that a work purporting to be nonfactual 
can defame an individual raises questions of meaning with which 
courts and commentators have long grappled.  The issue typically 
arises in the form of a plaintiff’s contention that the defendant’s 
 
158 Eyal, 583 N.E. 2d at 429 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). 
159 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007) (alteration in original). 
160 Id. at 555 (internal citation omitted). 
161 Id. at 564. 
162 Id. at 556. 
163 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
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work contains a thinly disguised, but libelously false, portrayal of 
the plaintiff.  In other instances, the defendant has given a 
repellant character a name that happens to coincide with that of 
the plaintiff.164  Both circumstances present the danger that jurors 
will be swayed more by sympathy for a distraught plaintiff than 
by the demanding criteria of the “of and concerning” requirement.  
Failure by courts to guard against invalid conflation of fact and 
fiction risks stifling creative expression protected and encouraged 
by the First Amendment. 
A. Inherent Challenges and Varied Solutions 
Though case law on defamatory fiction lacks cohesion,165 the 
Restatement captures the basic prevailing philosophy: 
A libel may be published of an actual person by a story or essay, 
novel, play or moving picture that is intended to deal only with 
fictitious characters if the characters or plot bear such a 
resemblance to actual persons or events as to make it reasonable 
for its readers or audience to understand that a particular 
character is intended to portray that person.166 
This concept is hardly self-executing, and numerous 
commentators have advanced specific tests to refine the inquiry.167  
 
164 Still other works consciously depict a particular individual but avowedly take 
imaginative liberties with the person’s life. Film “biopics” are well-known examples of 
this genre. See, e.g., RAGING BULL (Chartoff-Winkler Productions 1980) (relating life 
of boxer Jake LaMotta); THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010) (portraying 
founding of Facebook by Mark Zuckerberg). Rarely litigated, such works are outside 
the scope of this analysis. This discussion also excludes instances in which the 
disputed work places the plaintiff in an unmistakably fantastical or satirical setting. 
See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (“The test 
is not whether the story is or is not characterized as ‘fiction’ . . . but whether the 
charged portions in context could be reasonably understood as describing actual facts 
about the plaintiff or actual events in which she participated.”). In Pring, the court 
found that the plaintiff’s identity could be discerned in the defendant’s story, but 
overturned the jury’s award of damages because the story could not be reasonably 
understood to describe actual conduct by the plaintiff. See id. at 443 (“The charged 
portions of the story described something physically impossible in an impossible 
setting . . . [I]t is simply impossible to believe that a reader would not have understood 
that the charged portions were pure fantasy and nothing else.”). Though the suit 
foundered on the lack of factual content rather than of plaintiff identity, it still 
illustrates the potential inclination of jurors to find for a sympathetic plaintiff  
who has apparently suffered emotionally but has not established the legal requisites 
for libel. 
165 See Matthew Savare, Comment, Falsity, Fault, and Fiction: A New Standard 
for Defamation in Fiction, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 155, 155 nn. 219–20 (2004). 
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 cmt. d. 
167 See, e.g., Martin Garbus & Richard Kurnit, Libel Claims Based on Fiction 
Should Be Lightly Dismissed, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 403 (1985) (recommending as 
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This diversity in approaches reflects in part the problem that 
the idea of defamation by fiction on its face seems contradictory.  
Whatever larger “truths” about life literature may offer, they are 
contained in a vehicle that is the product of the defendant’s 
imagination.  Since libel claims allege that the defendant has 
misrepresented the plaintiff’s reality, the charge is arguably 
misdirected at a work that does not proclaim itself as presenting 
reality at all.  As one judge commented, “Every fiction writer 
knows his creation is in some sense ‘false.’ . . . Therefore, where 
fiction is the medium . . . it is meaningless to charge that the 
author ‘knew’ his work was false.”168  Similarly, the charge that a 
fictional character both represents and darkly deviates from the 
plaintiff can have a self-defeating quality, for the plaintiff is 
simultaneously arguing that the character is and is not that 
person.169  Moreover, to infer from the plaintiff’s shared 
characteristics with a fictional figure that the latter portrays the 
former is to ignore that artists routinely draw from and transform 
actual persons in the creation of their work.170  Given such  
 
 
part of proposed three-pronged inquiry that a “court determine . . . whether the 
plaintiff has established an identity with the fictional character and whether a 
reasonable reader would attribute the defamatory aspects of that character to the 
plaintiff”); Paul A. LeBel, The Infliction of Harm Through the Publication of Fiction: 
Fashioning a Theory of Liability, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 304–319 (1985) (setting forth 
factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant should be liable for harm 
caused by the publication of fiction); Mark Arnot, Note, When Is Fiction Just Fiction? 
Applying Heightened Threshold Tests to Defamation in Fiction, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1853, 1900 (2007) (“[A] work of fiction must ‘not only be reasonably read’ as stating 
actual facts about the plaintiff, but must ‘also affirmatively suggest that the author 
intends or endorses’ the literal reading.” (quoting Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 
F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 
512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990))); Smirlock, supra note 97, at 521 (proposing as criteria 
“unmistakability” of a statement’s reference to the plaintiff, “individuality” of  
the reference, and inspiration of “conviction” in the reader that work describes  
the plaintiff). 
168 Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, 
C.J., concurring). 
169 See William E. Carlson, Comment, Defamation by Fiction, 42 MD. L. REV. 387, 
410–11 (1983) (“A person who denies having any of his counterpart’s ‘unsavory 
characteristics’ unwittingly may negate a perception that the writing describes 
him. . . . A reader cannot mechanically disregard all defamatory characteristics and 
identify the character based solely on the remaining nondefamatory characteristics.” 
(citation omitted)). 
170 See Isidore Silver, Libel, the “Higher Truths” of Art, and the First Amendment, 
126 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1078 (1978) (“The process of artistic creation is a complex one 
that often involves the creation of characters bearing some resemblance to people the 
artist has known.”). 
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considerations, it is not surprising that some observers have called 
for extending blanket immunity from libel suits to authors and 
publishers of fiction.171  
Nevertheless, courts and most commentators have rejected 
categorical protection for fiction.  Instead, they have embraced the 
position that “[r]eputations may not be traduced with 
impunity . . . under the literary forms of a work of fiction.”172  The 
language of “forms” appears to reflect an underlying concern that 
automatic immunity for works that purport to be fictional would 
supply creators means and incentive to cloak what amounts to 
factual accusations in the garb of fiction.173  Thus, while a work’s 
designation as fiction can inform a reasonable understanding  
of whether it contains a defamatory falsehood, it is this 
understanding rather than the formal label assigned that resolves 
the issue. 
Little judicial consensus exists, however, on means of  
yielding such an understanding.  Rather, the kinds and  
degrees of similarities between plaintiffs and their fictional 
counterparts required to make a work actionable tend to be—
perhaps inevitably—a highly particularized determination.  The 
much-discussed case of Aguilar v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
illustrates the individualized and subjective nature of this 
judgment.174  There, the plaintiff alleged that she had been libeled 
by the portrayal of a character of “loose morals” in the film Zoot 
 
171 See, e.g., Heidi Stam, Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for Absolute 
First Amendment Protection, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 571, 571 (1980); see also Robert D. 
Richards, When “Ripped from the Headlines” Means “See You in Court”: Libel by 
Fiction and the Tort-Law Twist on a Controversial Defamation Concept, 13 TEX. REV. 
ENT. & SPORTS L. 117, 137 (2012) (proposing application of innocent-construction rule 
to libel-by-fiction cases so as to bar such suits “except in the most egregious 
instances”). 
172 Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 65 (1920); see also, e.g., Smith v. 
Stewart, 660 S.E.2d 822, 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“Simply because a book is labeled 
‘fiction’ does not mean that it may not be defamatory.”); Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, 
672 N.E.2d 1207, 1221 (Ill. 1996) (“[W]e must reject the defendants’ claim that the 
story cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts simply because it is 
labeled fiction.” (emphasis omitted)); Allied Mktg. Grp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
111 S.W.3d 168, 173 n.3 (Tx. App. 2003); Donald Meltzer, Note, Toward a New 
Standard of Liability for Defamation in Fiction, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1138 (1983) 
(“Certain works labeled ‘fiction’ may mirror reality so closely that a reasonable person 
might consider such a work or a statement therein to be a ‘statement of fact.’ ”). 
173 See SMOLLA, supra note 28, § 4:48 (“Some device is required to allow defamed 
plaintiffs recompense when a work of fiction is nothing but a shield for an intentional 
attack on reputation.”). 
174 See 219 Cal. Rptr. 891, 893–94 (Ct. App. 1985). 
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Suit.175  The movie’s story was based on the sensational Sleepy 
Lagoon murder case and the riots that followed.176  According to 
the complaint, the disreputable character was identified with the 
plaintiff because both had the first name “Bertha,” the plaintiff 
had been involved in the riots, and others believed that the  
film’s “Bertha” was the plaintiff.177  Affirming a grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants, the court found this evidence 
“insufficient to raise a triable issue” as to whether the character 
represented the plaintiff.178  The court ruled that the identity of 
names could not suffice to establish that the film’s fictional Bertha 
was “of and concerning” the plaintiff.179  Nor did enough other 
similarities exist to support a reasonable belief that the movie 
depicted the plaintiff.  For example, the character was much older 
than the plaintiff at the time of the Sleepy Lagoon incident, did 
not physically resemble the plaintiff, and played a role in the 
incident highly dissimilar to the plaintiff’s role.180  That a single 
witness claimed to believe that “Bertha” was the plaintiff based on 
coincidence of first names was far too meager to compensate for 
these deficiencies.181 
The reasoning and outcome of Aguilar appear 
unexceptionable.  Yet, the indeterminacy of standards in this area 
would have enabled another court with different sensibilities to 
reach a different conclusion and allow the suit to proceed.  It would 
then not be difficult to imagine a jury, moved by the plaintiff’s 
account of trauma, finding that the two Berthas were one and the 
same.  
The potential for such a scenario can be seen in Bryson v. 
News America Publications.182  In Bryson, the plaintiff sued over a 
magazine short story that appeared as part of a series called “New 
Voices in Fiction.”183  At one point the story’s narrator described a 
classmate with the plaintiff’s last name as a “slut.”184  Both the 
trial and appellate courts dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.185  
 
175 Id. at 891. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 892. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 893–94. 
181 See id. at 894–95. 
182 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1218–19 (Ill. 1996). 
183 Id. at 1213. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 1212.  
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Reversing, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that the story 
took place in southern Illinois, home to both the plaintiff and 
author, that the plaintiff alleged that the character shared about 
two-dozen physical features and experiences with the plaintiff, 
and, especially, that the character bore the uncommon name 
Bryson.186  Given these similarities, the court allowed the plaintiff 
a chance to prove that the character bore “such a close 
resemblance to the plaintiff that reasonable persons would 
understand that the character was actually intended to portray 
the plaintiff.”187  
Decisions like Bryson must give pause to authors who draw 
elements of their characters—even inadvertently—from actual 
individuals.  The sheer unpredictability of courts’ disposition of 
libel claims over such works is illustrated by the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s reversal of two prior rulings against the plaintiff’s claim.188  
Moreover, the court effectively found that the plaintiff had cleared 
two substantial hurdles, which in combination should have 
demanded a powerful showing by the plaintiff.  First is the heavy 
burden placed on all plaintiffs who contend that fictional 
characters amount to portrayals of themselves.189  Additionally, a 
claim drawn from a reference allegedly to the plaintiff as a “slut” 
must overcome authority that epithets and pejorative terms in and 
of themselves do not ordinarily constitute actionable factual 
accusations.190  In Bryson, the story’s narrator states in the 
offending passage: “Who knows what guys like that made Bryson 
do. . . . I remembered what a slut she was and forgot about the 
sorriness I’d been holding onto for her.”191  While the court 
reasoned that the first of these sentences placed a specific gloss on 
 
186 See id. at 1219. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 1225.  
189 See Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 320 (1st Dep’t 1982), aff’d, 60 
N.Y.2d 916 (1983); Carter-Clark v. Random House, Inc., 196 Misc. 2d 1011, 1013 (Sup. 
Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2003), aff’d, 17 A.D.3d 241 (1st Dep’t 2005); R. Bruce Rich & Livia D. 
Brilliant, Defamation-in-Fiction: The Limited Viability of Alternative Causes of Action, 
52 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1986); Bettina M. Chin, Note, Regulating Your Second 
Life: Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1303, 1336 (2007) (describing 
requirement as “quite strict”). 
190 See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 
U.S. 264, 285–86 (1974) (finding “scab” to be “merely rhetorical hyperbole”); Greenbelt 
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970) (noting that “blackmail” 
“was no more than rhetorical hyperbole”). 
191 Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1213. 
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the second,192 speculation that does not imply the speaker’s 
personal knowledge of a defamatory fact is ordinarily protected.193  
Nevertheless, the court approved a claim based on “an opinion 
uttered by a fictional character about another fictional character” 
in a brief episode of a story portraying adolescent life.194  The range 
of possible libel actions based on this attenuated chain of logic 
would appear limitless.195 
Such an approach also threatens to inhibit the creation of 
“faction” in which actual figures appear in an invented 
narrative.196  A staple of books,197 film,198 and television,199 such 
works could be made vulnerable to suits by living individuals 
portrayed in them under Bryson’s mode of analysis.  Obviously, a 
producer of fiction can argue that the portrayal of a person’s 
behavior can only be understood as an imagined course of conduct 
in the setting of a fictional work.  Indeed, Isidore Silver has 
deemed it “error to assume that, because a work of faction 
impresses one as somewhat ‘historical’ or ‘realistic,’ it is any less 
fictional than the purest fantasy or romance.”200  In Bryson, 
however, the court disparaged the notion that a “fictional label” 
could be relied upon to deflect readers’ inclination to equate a 
fictional character with the plaintiff.201 
 
192 See id. at 1217. 
193 See Gray v. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 250 (1st Cir. 2000); Levin v. 
McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1997); Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1156 
(9th Cir. 1995). 
194 Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1228 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
195 See ROBIN HEMLEY, TURNING LIFE INTO FICTION 173 (2006); Savare, supra 
note 165, at 143 n.125 (“The holding in Bryson puts at risk almost any writer of fiction 
who has had a real experience in this world. It expands the possible universe of 
plaintiffs to those who have merely crossed paths with a writer.” (quoting Sandra 
Baron in telephone interview)); Wes Smith, Libel in Fiction? Trial Will Tell Story, CHI. 
TRIB. (Nov. 17, 1996), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1996-11-17-
9611170256-story.html. 
196 See Faction, n.2, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2014). See generally Silver, 
supra note 170, at 1067. 
197 See, e.g., TRUMAN CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD: A TRUE ACCOUNT OF A MULTIPLE 
MURDER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (Vintage Int’l ed. 2012); NORMAN MAILER, THE 
EXECUTIONER’S SONG (First Grand Cent. Pub. Trade ed. 2012); TOM WOLFE, THE 
ELECTRIC KOOL-AID ACID TEST (1968). 
198 See, e.g., ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Bros. 1976); CHARLIE WILSON’S 
WAR (Universal Pictures 2007). 
199 See, e.g., Narcos (Netflix, Aug. 28, 2015–Sept. 1, 2017); When We Rise (ABC 
television broadcast, Feb. 27, 2017–Mar. 3, 2017). 
200 See Silver, supra note 170, at 1086. 
201 See Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1219 (Ill. 1996). 
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Again, the court reached this conclusion where a private 
individual complained of a passing remark by a fictional narrator 
about a fictional character in an imagined story.  Presumably the 
“fictional label” would carry even less weight where the plaintiff 
recognizably appears in the work at issue.  Under Bryson’s lax 
standard, such an individual might readily survive the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss.  That the defendant would then still have the 
opportunity to persuade the jury not to equate the plaintiff and the 
plaintiff’s factional namesake does not obviate the need for a 
higher bar at an earlier stage.  In addition to concerns already 
expressed202—including costs203—about leaving issues of plaintiff 
identification to juries, those concerns increase in this forum.   
The job of distinguishing libelous charge from imaginative liberty 
under the First Amendment may prove especially challenging  
to jurors.  
In this respect, the experience of juries’ application of the 
actual malice standard may be instructive.  One study found that 
about two-thirds of trial verdicts against media defendants were 
reversed where the appellate court ruled specifically on the issue 
of actual malice.204  In light of such data, and of a well-known 
report on a jury’s struggle to apply the standard in a high-profile 
case,205 one scholar concluded that “juries are confused by the 
complexities of Sullivan’s categorical, constitutional rules.”206  If 
so, juries may find application of the “of and concerning” 
requirement to faction even more baffling than the concept of 
actual malice.  With actual malice, jurors are asked to gauge the 
level of intent with which a plaintiff uttered a defamatory 
falsehood.  However difficult that inquiry, it is conceptually more 
focused than determining whether the version of the plaintiff who 
appears in a work of fiction is “really” that individual.  The latter 
calls for sophistication in assessing a range of evidence bearing on 
the place of the plaintiff in the disputed work and in the world.  
Moreover, just as bias is thought to account in part for libel 
 
202 See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
203 Susan Gilles has pointed out that a large portion of a defendant’s costs in a 
libel suit have already been incurred before the summary judgment stage. See Gilles, 
supra note 31, at 1780–81. 
204 Id. at 1778. 
205 See Stephen Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, 
AM. LAW., Nov. 1982, at 1, 94, cited in Susanna Frederick Fischer, Rethinking 
Sullivan: New Approaches in Australia, New Zealand, and England, 34 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 101, 187 (2002). 
206 Fischer, supra note 31, at 187. 
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verdicts against media defendants in cases that hinge on actual 
malice,207 some jurors may be influenced by emotion rather than 
by analytical abstractions in drawing conclusions about faction.  
The shame or anger displayed by the plaintiff may hold more sway 
than nuances of literary theory or a fine calculation of the overlap 
between the plaintiff’s actual and fictional lives.208 
In a sense, then, faction represents in heightened form the 
uncertainty over legal treatment of fiction generally that can exert 
a chilling effect on authors and publishers.  Confronted with 
indeterminate standards and unpredictable juries, they “simply 
cannot tell which aspects of a portrayal will be considered 
significant in comparing plaintiffs and characters.”209  This specter 
may intimidate them into rendering characters in less vivid hues 
or forego certain works altogether.  Nor can this impact be 
measured; the amount of work diluted or halted for fear of a libel 
action by its nature tends to be untraceable.  Even authors and 
other creators who justifiably expect to be vindicated cannot 
forecast the costs they will incur to defeat a suit.  With judges 
reluctant to intrude on the jury’s role and jurors susceptible to 
misapplication of First Amendment doctrine, libel defendants may 
have to absorb the large expenses generated on the long road from 
initial complaint to successful appeal. 
B. Chronic Inconsistencies 
It would be unrealistic to demand precise uniformity of 
treatment and result for a problem as variegated and 
multijurisdictional as libel through fiction.  Nevertheless, 
divergences among courts have produced an unpredictability that 
 
207 See Gilles, supra note 31, at 1794–95; Tigran W. Eldred, Note, Amplifying Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union: The Proper Scope of De Novo Appellate Review in Public 
Person Defamation Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 588–89 (1989). At this time, it is 
speculative but plausible to think that various public accusations of “fake news” may 
come to contribute to jurors’ attitudes in such cases. See e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, 
Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at Mainstream Media, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 12/25/us/politics/fake-news-
claims-conservatives-mainstream-media-.html; John Hayward, Sean Hannity: People 
Don’t Need ‘Fake News’ Corporate Media Anymore; Landscape Shifting to Breitbart, 
Drudge, Talk Radio, BREITBART (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.breitbart.com/radio/ 
2016/11/28/sean-hannity-people-dont-need-fake-news-shifting-breitbart-drudge-talk-
radio/. 
208 Another kind of potential bias is the temptation for jurors to align their votes 
with their publicly espoused values. See Silver, supra note 170, at 1082–83. (“[J]uries 
may well find liability for works they publicly abhor but secretly enjoy.”). 
209 Smirlock, supra note 97, at 531. 
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is disturbing even under a far more indulgent expectation.  
Creators of fictional characters and those who disseminate their 
works cannot reliably anticipate whether a self-proclaimed 
real-life counterpart will haul them into court or how much weight 
that court will assign to First Amendment values.  As one 
commentator pointedly observed, defendants “cannot tell whether 
a fictional description’s ‘ugliness’ serves to preclude identification 
or whether it constitutes false and libelous matter.  They will be 
unsure whether even their best efforts will shield them from libel, 
or whether a mere disclaimer will suffice.”210  And if judges—
presumably familiar with legal authority and precedent—adopt 
such diverse approaches, then the caprices of individual juries 
must be all the more treacherous.211 
As the reference to disclaimers above suggests, courts differ 
widely even on the fundamental question of how much a work’s 
representation as fiction should shape their analysis.  As noted 
earlier, the court in Bryson was almost disdainful of the idea that 
a work’s designation as fiction should influence its determination 
even in view of the plaintiff’s tangential connection to a short 
story’s character.212  Nor was the Illinois court isolated in this 
attitude.  In Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals expressly looked to Bryson for guidance 
in finding that a story’s assertion that it does not mean to describe 
any real person “does not mean that it may not be defamatory per 
se.”213  The film that provoked Robert Muzikowski’s suit had stated 
in its credits, “While this motion picture is in part inspired by 
actual events, persons and organizations, this is a fictitious story 
and no actual persons, events or organizations have been 
portrayed.”214  While Muzikowski had become well-known for 
coaching Little League Baseball teams in struggling areas of 
Chicago, the film included no character named “Robert” or 
“Muzikowski” or any references to Little League Baseball.215  
Moreover, the character whose criminal behavior formed the basis 
of the suit differed from Muzikowski in significant ways.  For 
 
210 Id. 
211 See Savare, supra note 165, at 156. 
212 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
213 322 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672 
N.E.2d 1207, 1219 (Ill. 1996)). 
214 Id. at 922. 
215 See id. at 921–22. Muzikowski’s alleged fictional counterpart, however, did 
coach an inner-city baseball league. See id. at 926. 
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example, the character copes with a gambling addiction216 and 
“never breaks his drinking habit.”217  Neither the disclaimer nor 
these differences sufficed to halt the suit.  Overturning the district 
court’s order to dismiss, the Seventh Circuit gave the plaintiff the 
opportunity to show that no innocent construction of the 
character’s portrayal was reasonably possible.218 
At the same time, other courts appear to treat a work’s 
designation as fiction as creating an overwhelming presumption 
that it does not portray the plaintiff.  In Middlebrooks v. Curtis 
Publishing Co., the plaintiff could point to considerable overlap 
between his circumstances and those of a short story’s character 
as well as to numerous witnesses who testified that they believed 
the character represented the plaintiff.219  The court nevertheless 
dismissed the suit, emphasizing that the story “was an obvious 
work of fiction.  It was listed in the fiction section of the 
[magazine’s] index, was labeled fiction, and was illustrated by 
cartoons.”220  In a similar vein, the court in Smith v. Huntington 
Publishing Co. acknowledged that a news story focusing on a 
troubled individual assigned a fictitious name also described in 
notable ways the plaintiff who happened to have the same name.221  
Despite the similarity of struggles and identity of names, however, 
the court granted summary judgment for the defendant.222  To the 
court, any reasonable belief that the article reported on the 
plaintiff was dispelled by the “clear statement by the author in 
boldface print that the names were fictitious.”223 
In Aguilar as well, the court’s grant of summary judgment for 
the defendant highlighted at the outset of its analysis: “Mere 
Identity or Similarity of Names Is Insufficient to Prove a Work of 
 
216 Id. at 926. 
217 Id. at 922. 
218 Id. at 927. The presence of disclaimers in Greene v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 
138 F. Supp. 3d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), similarly failed to halt a claim. The closing 
credits of the film The Wolf of Wall Street announced that some of its characters were 
composites of actual individuals depicted in the memoir on which the movie was based 
and that “any similarity . . . to the actual character or history of any person . . . is 
entirely for dramatic purposes and not intended to reflect on an actual character, 
history, product or entity.” Id. at 230. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was allowed to 
proceed with his contention that one of the film’s characters falsely portrayed him as 
“as a criminal, drug user, degenerate, depraved, and/or devoid of any morality or 
ethics.” Id. at 230–31. 
219 413 F.2d 141, 142 (4th Cir. 1969). 
220 Id. at 143. 
221 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1272–73 (S.D. Ohio 1975). 
222 Id. at 1274. 
223 Id.  
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Fiction Is Of and Concerning a Real Person.”224  This principle also 
defeated the claim in Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 
Inc., where the door panel of a gambler’s office, briefly shown in a 
television crime drama, bore the same name as the plaintiff’s 
business.225  For the court, the nature of the program was decisive:  
“The script from which the performance was dramatized was 
wholly fictional.  The plot, settings, characters and dialogue  
were entirely the product of imagination.”226  Even a series of 
advertisements by a company mocking a fictional corporation that 
used terminology associated with a rival was protected by  
their fictional nature.227  As the court summarized, “[T]he only 
reasonable inference to be drawn from these advertisements  
is that Sid’s Waste Water Treatment Emporium is a purely 
fictional enterprise.”228 
Another area of uncertainty for creators whose characters 
resemble actual individuals is the role a court will assign to their 
presumed intent.  Notwithstanding the oft-quoted doctrine that it 
“is not so much who was aimed at as who was hit,”229 courts are 
often influenced by their perception of whether an author meant 
to present a thinly veiled portrait of the plaintiff.  In Fetler,230 for 
example, the plaintiff’s suit was bolstered by his asseveration that 
the novel’s author—“his brother told him that the book, which he 
was then writing, ‘was about our father, the family concerts and 
me.’ ”231  Conversely, the court in Aguilar232 found significant to its 
grant of summary judgment for the defendant “the uncontradicted 
testimony of the author . . . [that] he had never heard of Ms. 
 
224 Aguilar v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 891, 892 (Ct. App.  
1985) (capitalization and italics in original); see also supra notes 174–181 and 
accompanying text. 
225 205 Misc. 357, 359 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1954).  
226 Id. at 360. 
227 See Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404, 413–14 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
228 Id. at 414–15. 
229 Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 64 (1920). As the court elaborated, 
a publisher “is chargeable with the publication of the libelous matter if it was spoken 
‘of and concerning’ [the plaintiff], even though it was unaware of his existence, or that 
it was written ‘of and concerning’ any existing person.” Id. at 63. 
230 Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966). See supra notes 
103–108 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
231 Fetler, 364 F.2d at 651. 
232 Aguilar v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Ct. App. 1985). See 
supra notes 174–181 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
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Aguilar” before his work was written.233  Similarly, in Clare,234 the 
court repeatedly emphasized the defendant’s intent to write a 
fictional story,235 finally ruling against the plaintiff on the ground 
that the defendant “did not intend to write the book of plaintiff or 
intend to appropriate plaintiff’s name to the story.”236  In Landau, 
too, the court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit assigned importance 
to the absence of any “attempt by the defendants . . . to create any 
other impression” than for the play at issue to recount “an 
imaginary event involving fictional characters.”237 
Yet other courts have declared the defendant’s intent simply 
irrelevant to its analysis.  In Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp., the court’s acknowledgement that the 
defendant “intended to use a fictional company name” that turned 
out to coincide with the plaintiff’s did not invalidate the plaintiff’s 
claim.238  Rather, because the viewer’s reasonable understanding 
controlled, “it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the 
defendant intended to refer to the plaintiff.”239  Sustaining a 
verdict against the defendant in Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 
Inc.,240 the court there likewise stated:  “If the communication is 
reasonably understood by the person to whom it is made as 
intended to refer to the plaintiff, it is immaterial that the defamer 
did not intend to refer to him.”241  Other courts have recited this 
principle even as they have ultimately ruled against the plaintiff.  
In Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., for example, the court 
granted summary judgment to the defendant after noting that 
“[t]he test is [not] the intent of the author . . . . The test is whether 
a reasonable person could reasonably believe that the article 
referred to the plaintiff.” 242 
 
233 Aguilar, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 894–95. 
234 Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947). See supra notes 58–63 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
235 See Clare, 70 F. Supp. at 277–79. 
236 Id. at 278. 
237 Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 360, 362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cnty. 1954); cf. Tamkin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 266–68 (Ct. App. 
2011) (dismissing under California statute a libel suit by real estate agents whose 
names were used as placeholders in the preliminary script of a television episode 
where the defendants did not intend for the script to be disseminated on the Internet). 
238 111 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Tex. App. 2003). See supra notes 140–142 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
239 Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc., 111 S.W.3d at 173. 
240 191 F.2d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 1951). See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of this case. 
241 Davis, 191 F.2d at 904 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
242 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D. Ohio 1975). 
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Implicit in these and other suits based on fiction is the 
unpredictability of what a court or jury will consider the “sweet 
spot” between a character’s resembling a plaintiff so closely as to 
meet the “of and concerning” requirement and departing so 
harshly as to support the charge of libel.  As suggested earlier,243 
the problem here is less inconsistency than the intrinsic 
impossibility of constructing a reliable guide to the degree of 
resemblance that will trigger actionability.  A notable example is 
the role that physical similarities or dissimilarities will play in a 
court’s calculus.  In Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., for 
example, the court in dismissing the suit noted that “there is 
nothing about the physical description of the fictional Scott 
Tamkin, such as a special birthmark or a specific fashion accessory 
or hairstyle” that would support a reasonable inference that he 
represented the actual Scott Tamkin.244  In Bindrim v. Mitchell, by 
contrast, the court brushed aside the lengths to which a novel’s 
author went to distinguish her main character’s appearance from 
that of the plaintiff who inspired the work.245 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF GROUP DEFAMATION 
Another frequent source of claims that plaintiffs have suffered 
de facto defamation by inference is group defamation doctrine.  In 
suits based on fiction, the question is whether a purportedly 
imagined character effectively—but falsely—portrays the 
plaintiff.  Where issues of group defamation arise, by contrast, no 
one doubts that the defendant has described real people.  Rather, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that an allegedly defamatory 
statement about an aggregate body of persons refers specifically to 
the plaintiff.246  The Restatement articulates a widely followed 
standard for determining when a plaintiff may prevail on such  
a claim. 
One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or 
class of persons is subject to liability to an individual member of 
it if, but only if,  
 
243 See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text. 
244 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 274 (Ct. App. 2011). 
245 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 37 (Ct. App. 1979). 
246 See Bezons v. Nelson, 155 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (“[I]f 
defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a class or group, there is no cause of 
action unless the words can be made to apply to a single member of that group or to 
every member of the group.” (citations omitted)). 
958 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:919 
(a) the group or class is so small that the matter can 
reasonably be understood to refer to the member,  
or  
(b) the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to 
the conclusion that there is particular reference to the 
member.247 
A group of more than twenty-five members is presumptively too 
large to support a libel claim by one of its individual members.248  
Though this rule of thumb is defensible,249 it still leaves ample 
scope for divergent judicial interpretation and jury bias below the 
twenty-five-member threshold.  As with fiction, then, group libel 
suits should contain heightened safeguards against the abuse of 
claims based on defamation by inference. 
A. Principles, Rationales, and Standards 
Notwithstanding variations in analysis, courts generally 
agree on a handful of principles governing group defamation 
claims.  In evaluating a small group defamation claim, a court 
takes into account the group’s size, the portion of the group that 
has been defamed, and “the prominence of the group and its 
individual members” within the area where the defamatory charge 
is disseminated.250  Thus, where a statement defames an entire 
small group, individual members of the group can readily show 
that the statement referred to them.251  On the other hand, a 
member of a defamed organization has the burden of showing that 






247 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A. 
248 See Peterson v. Sanghi, No. 8-18-cv-020000-JLS-ADS, 2019 WL 1715487, at *6 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019); Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1185 (Cal. 1986); 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 750 (4th ed. 1971); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b. 
249 See Nat Stern, The Certainty Principle as Justification for the Group 
Defamation Rule, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 969 (2008). 
250 Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 239 (2d Dep’t 1981). 
251 See id. at 231. 
252 Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News, Inc., 132 A.D.3d 82, 88 (1st Dep’t 
2015); see also Yow v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2008) 
(“ ‘[I]f the group is small and its members easily ascertainable, [the] plainiff[] may 
succeed,’ on an individual action based on the defamatory matter being directed at the 
group.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Blatty, 728 P.2d at 1885)). 
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Similar to the notion of “prominence,” courts consider group libel 
claims from the perspective of the average informed253 and 
reasonable254 reader. 
Undergirding the group defamation rule is the idea that 
libelous statements about large groups offers too attenuated a link 
with any single member to support a claim of individual harm.  In 
the words of one court, “[T]he larger the collectivity named in the 
libel, the less likely it is that a reader would understand it to refer 
to a particular individual.”255  Even where such sweeping 
generalizations are taken at face value, audiences are unlikely to 
find them credible.256  Moreover, the availability of suits by 
individual members could trigger multiple, potentially prohibitive, 
claims.257  This prospect has especially troubling potential to 
dampen free public discussion.258  Conversely, the ability to bring 
 
253 See Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Tran, 287 F. Supp. 2d 167, 174 (W.D.N.Y. 
2003) (upholding suit where underlying facts connecting medical practice group to 
defamed individual physicians were “known to those who read or heard the 
publication”); Gonzalez v. Sessom, 137 P.3d 1245, 1248 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (noting 
article’s reference to plaintiff to be “measured by its natural and probable effect upon 
the mind of the average lay reader” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); 
Marr v. Putnam, 246 P.2d 509, 521 (Or. 1952) (permitting claim because “persons with 
a knowledge of the circumstances” could have understood article as referring to 
plaintiffs); Harvest House Publishers. v. Local Church, 190 S.W.3d 204, 214 (Tex. App. 
2006) (repeatedly describing relevant perspective as that of the “reasonable reader”). 
254 See AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 
1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1990) (interpreting publication “in the sense in which hearers or 
readers of common and reasonable understanding would ascribe to [it]” (alteration in 
original) (internal citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Harvest House 
Publishers, 190 S.W.3d at 214 (conducting objective inquiry of what “the hypothetical 
reasonable reader” would believe). 
255 Brady, 84 A.D.2d at 228; see also Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080, 
1089–90 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
256 See Barger v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1983) 
(Courts are inclined to “presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements 
[about a large class of people] as literally applying to each individual member.”), aff’d, 
732 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1984); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 18.6, at 489 (1999) 
“[M]ost people have already formed their baseline opinions about large groups of 
individuals and are, therefore, unlikely to be swayed by general denunciations that 
run counter to their own opinions.”). 
257 See Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893, 900 
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (expressing concern that permitting claims by members of large 
group “could invite any number of vexatious lawsuits”), aff’d, 665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 
1981); Ellyn Tracy Marcus, Comment, Group Defamation and Individual Actions:  
A New Look at an Old Rule, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1532, 1555 (1983) (“[A] multiplicity of 
actions could expose defendants to liability severely out of proportion to the harm the 
speakers have actually inflicted.”). 
258 See Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10–CV–05022–LHK., 2011 WL 2441898, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (“The rationale for [the group libel] rule is to protect 
freedom of public discussion . . . .”); Brady, 84 A.D.2d at 229 (stating the group 
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suit when a statement tars a small group embodies the judgment 
that readers or auditors will probably connect the collective libel 
to each member.259 
The presumptive immunity of statements about groups of 
more than twenty-five members represents the principal effort to 
bring some predictability to an inherently inexact analysis.  The 
operation of this principle was famously illustrated by the 
influential ruling in Neiman-Marcus v. Lait.260  There, a book had 
asserted that most of the salesmen at Neiman-Marcus’s Dallas 
store were “fairies” and that some of the salesgirls were “call 
girls.”261  The court allowed a suit by fifteen of the store’s 
twenty-five salesmen,262 but dismissed an action by 30 of 382 
saleswomen on the “widely accepted” ground that “[w]here the 
group or class libelled is large, none can sue even though the 
language used is inclusive.”263  Though the twenty-five member 
limit for actionability does not constitute a hard ceiling,264 it 
appears to offer more space for uninhibited speech than 
application of multiple factors to particular cases. 
Nevertheless, a number of courts have rejected “slavish 
reliance upon the general rule which relies upon numbers alone”265 
and adopted a multi-factor approach.  The most prominent 
multifactor method examines “the intensity of the suspicion cast 
 
defamation rule is “designed to encourage frank discussions of matters of public 
concern under the First Amendment guarantees”). 
259 See Note, Developments in the Law Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 894 
(1956) (“Where the group is small there is a great likelihood that others will 
understand that the defendant intended to attribute certain qualities, beliefs, or acts 
to each member.”); EPSTEIN, supra note 256, § 18.6, at 490 (pointing to the “rough 
empirical judgment . . . that the more focused the attack, the greater the potential 
reputational harm”). 
260 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
261 Id. at 313. 
262 Id. at 316–17. The court took for granted that an accusation of homosexuality 
was libelous per se. This premise has since been questioned in light of advancing social 
and cultural norms. See generally Holly Miller, Homosexuality as Defamation: A 
Proposal for the Use of the “Right-Thinking Minds” Approach in the Development of 
Modern Jurisprudence, 18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349 (2013); Anthony Michael Kreis, 
Lawrence Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms with Sexual-Orientation 
Defamation, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 125 (2012). 
263 Neiman-Marcus, 13 F.R.D. at 315 (citations omitted); see also id. at 316 
(stating that no reasonable person would “conclude from the publication a reference 
to any individual saleswoman.” (citations omitted)). 
264 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b (stating that “[i]t is not 
possible to set definite limits as to the size of the group or class” above which a libelous 
generalization cannot be considered of and concerning an individual member). 
265 McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 836 (Okla. 1984). 
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upon the plaintiff”266 by the defendant’s collective libel.267  The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted this test in a case ignited by an 
article appearing to charge “[University of] Oklahoma players” 
with taking amphetamines.268  In upholding a directed verdict for 
the plaintiff, who was not one of the team’s stars,269 the court 
refused to find decisive that the team comprised sixty to seventy 
players.  Rather, under circumstances like these, “even a general 
derogatory reference to a group does affect the reputation of every 
member” and liability can attach where the suspicion placed on 
the plaintiff is sufficiently intense.270  In a case widely followed in 
New York, a court there based its adoption of the “intensity of 
suspicion test” on the premise that “[a]n absolute limit on size” 
was “unduly restrictive” and “arbitrary.”271  While acknowledging 
that size was relevant, the court set forth a number of other  
factors to be considered when determining whether defamation of 
a group brought a member into disrepute.272  Applying this  
analysis, the court authorized a suit by twenty-seven of a city 
police department’s fifty-three officers over a suggestion that  
they had been accessories to misconduct by eighteen indicted 
fellow officers.273 
While the Restatement’s position retains considerable 
ambiguity when applied to groups with twenty-five members or 
fewer, the “intensity of suspicion” test raises far more uncertainty.  
Though the test has found favor with some commentators,274 its 
 
266 Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 52 (Okla. 1962) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Note, Liability for Defamation of a Group, 34 
Colum. L. Rev. 1322, 1325 (1934)). 
267 Commentators have also proposed standards that weigh specific factors. See, 
e.g., Jeffrey S. Bromme, Note, Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors, 64 TEX. L. 
REV. 591, 608 (1985); Marcus, supra note 257, at 1552. 
268 Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 377 P.2d at 47. 
269 He was a fullback on the alternate squad who had played in nine of the team’s 
eleven games. Id. at 47, 52. 
270 Id. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Note, supra note 266,  
at 1324–25). 
271 Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 234–37 (2d Dep’t 1981). 
See infra notes 324–327 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
272 Brady, 84 A.D.2d at 236–37 (citing Note, supra note 266, at 1326). 
273 Id. at 236–37, 240–41. 
274 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 10, at 57–58 
(1978) (describing Fawcett as a potential “landmark in the American law”); Bromme, 
supra note 267, at 597; David A. Elder, “Hostile Environment” Charges and the 
ABA/AALS Accreditation/Membership Imbroglio, Post-Modernism’s “No Country for 
Old Men”: Why Defamed Law Professors Should “Not Go Gentle Into that Good Night,” 
6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 434, 495–96, 504–05 (2009); Mason C. Lewis, The 
962 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:919 
free-floating, ad hoc approach leaves a broad spectrum of 
expression potentially exposed to liability.  The case in which the 
test originated illustrates its lack of guidance.  The court intuited 
that the plaintiff, though a part-time player, would “not be 
overlooked by those who were familiar with the team.”275  It is far 
from evident how later courts—and later speakers—could draw on 
this pivotal observation to determine the permissible boundaries 
of comments about large groups.  Moreover, a New York court 
noted that the balancing factors it enumerated were “not meant to 
be exclusive.”276  Thus, not only do speakers under this approach 
lack the assurance that comments about groups of over twenty-five 
members carry a strong presumption of immunity, they also 
cannot anticipate what factors will ultimately be deemed relevant.  
The standard’s vagueness inhibits speech in another way as well.  
Because of its extreme malleability, a court is less positioned to 
pronounce a given statement protected as a matter of law.  
Accordingly, a defendant is more likely to be subjected to the 
vagaries of jury predilections with which this Article is concerned. 
B. Difficulties of Application 
A brief survey of cases involving group defamation claims 
suggests their potential to inhibit even good-faith generalizations 
about a collection of individuals.  Admittedly, courts on the whole 
have not lightly permitted group libel claims to proceed.  Still, 
disparate treatment of similar claims, authorization of dubious 
suits, and the murky line between insufficient and permissible 
claims point to the value of erecting a higher threshold for  
such actions. 
In addressing group defamation claims, courts have generally 
required more than the literal or theoretical possibility that a 
defendant’s collective characterization specifically targeted the 
plaintiff.  In Riverhouse Publishing Co. v. Porter, the defendant 
had published a column describing the problem of “phony award 
schemes.”277  Though the column contained a phrase included in 
the title of the plaintiff’s biographical encyclopedia, the court held 
that the column could not be construed as referring to the plaintiff 
 
Individual Member’s Right to Recover for a Defamation Leveled at the Group, 17 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 519, 536 (1963). 
275 Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 377 P.2d at 52. 
276 Brady, 84 A.D.2d at 236. 
277 287 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.R.I. 1968). 
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or any other individual publisher.278  The complaint, asserted the 
court, “cannot make the plaintiff’s identity certain which is 
otherwise uncertain.”279 
Applying this type of reasoning, a court found that a circular 
raising doubts about the reliability of a certain kind of insurance 
company could not reasonably be understood as directed at a 
company of that nature:  “If the circular carries any libelous 
imputation, it is defamatory of a class and not of plaintiff as a 
member of that class.”280  Similarly, the court in Board of Forensic 
Document Examiners, Inc. v. American Bar Association dismissed 
a suit by seven document forensic examiners over the defendant’s 
assertion that examiners who had not met certain standards had 
not received appropriate training.281  For the court, the statement’s 
application to many others besides the plaintiffs282 removed it from 
the reach of small group libel doctrine.283 
In other instances, the very generality of defendants’ 
statements has immunized them from suit.  Granger v. Time, Inc. 
involved an article asserting that in one city “[a]rson has become 
common as people who are unable to sell their devalued buildings 
burn them for the insurance.”284  Given the large number of 
relevant fires, 481, and owners, 204, the court ruled that the 
statement could not be reasonably construed as specifically 
charging the two plaintiff owners with arson.285  Likewise, a book’s 
broad critical statements about managers of collateralized debt 
obligations were held insufficient to support an action by a 
manager on whom a chapter of the book had focused.286  Nor did a 





278 Id. at 4–5. 
279 Id. at 5. 
280 Hosp. Care Corp. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 9 S.E.2d 796, 800 (S.C. 1940). 
281 287 F. Supp. 3d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
282 In addition, five other individuals had also been certified under the plaintiff 
board’s putatively inadequate standards. See id. 
283 See id. 
284 Granger v. Time, Inc., 578 P.2d 535, 537 (Mont. 1977). 
285 See id. at 539–40. 
286 See Chau v. Lewis, 935 F. Supp. 2d 644, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 771 F.3d 
118, 121 (2d Cir. 2014). See also Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580 P.2d 642, 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1978), discussed at supra notes 126–130 and accompanying text, which offers a 
comparable rejection of a claim by a member of the class whom the defendant had 
disparaged. 
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mafia” furnish grounds for suit where no individuals were named 
and the plaintiffs included two entities that provided service to the 
establishment and three of their employees.287 
Indeed, even where plaintiffs constitute a small group of 
identifiable individuals, courts have often dismissed the suit for 
failure to demonstrate that the audience would have drawn that 
connection from the communication in question.  For example, in 
Lazore v. NYP Holdings, Inc., a newspaper editorial critical of a 
Mohawk tribe’s attempt to build a casino asserted that the tribe 
“amounts to a criminal enterprise.”288  The three chiefs of the 
Mohawk Tribal Council, the tribe’s ruling body, persuaded the 
trial court that their coordination of the casino project and the 
editorial’s supporting examples of illegal behavior by “the tribe,” 
“tribal members,” or “Mohawks” pointed to the chiefs individually 
as the operators of this “criminal enterprise.”289  Reversing,  
the appellate court concluded that “the offending statements  
were directed against a governing body and how it 
governed[;] . . . there were no statements that the Tribal Council 
members were individually corrupt or individually promoting a 
criminal enterprise.”290   
In a recent case, a manufacturer of helicopter helmets had 
warned of the inadequacies and dangers of helmets produced by 
certain unidentified companies.291  Two rival companies contended 
that the nation’s small number of helicopter helmet 
manufacturers meant that the warning would inevitably be 
understood as referring to one of them.292  Noting that none of the 
warnings mentioned the plaintiffs, however, the court found this 
link implausible and dismissed the complaint.293  Employing 
similar logic, a court rejected a claim by law enforcement officials 
who had been involved in the arrest of a major drug trafficker.294  
The article in question had repeated the trafficker’s claim that the 
arresting officers had stolen millions of dollars from his 
 
287 See Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 82, 87 (2016). 
288 61 A.D.3d 440, 440 (1st Dep’t 2009) (quoting Lazore v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 
08/102674, 2008 WL 6691430 at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 15, 2008)). 
289 Lazore, 2008 WL 6691430, at *5–6 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
290 Lazore, 61 A.D.3d at 440 (citations omitted). 
291 Helicopter Helmet, LLC v. Gentex Corp., No. 1:17-CV-00497, 2018 WL 
2023489, at *2–3 (D. Del. May 1, 2018). 
292 See id. at *4. 
293 Id. 
294 Haefner v. N.Y. Media, LLC, 82 A.D.3d 481, 482 (1st Dep’t 2011). 
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residence.295  The bare reference to an “NYPD/DEA strike force,” 
however, could not sustain a group libel claim in the absence of 
more specific descriptions of individual agents.296 
Nor can it fairly be said that judicial authorization of group 
libel claims necessarily reflects insensitivity to First Amendment 
values.  In some instances, the number of members in the defamed 
class is so small as to render a reference to the plaintiff altogether 
plausible.  In one such case, the defendant homeowner’s assertion 
that he had “2 crooks” as builders justified a suit by the second 
builder.297  In another, individual members of a four-attorney law 
firm that was accused of charging shockingly high fees were 
allowed to bring suit.298  Where the defamed group comprises a few 
more members, the defendant’s unqualified charge of group 
misconduct may sometimes realistically support claims by 
individual members.299  Claims of this number may also proceed 
where plaintiffs can credibly plead that their acquaintances would 
recognize the defendant’s allegedly false statement as referring  
to them.300 
Nevertheless, judicial recognition of some group libel claims 
raises questions about the adequacy of current eligibility for such 
suits.  In one case, the defendant had written that some academics 
and parents’ groups “accuse[d] D.A.R.E. supporters of . . . slashing 
scientists’ tires, making threatening phone calls in the middle of 
the night, harassing critics’ children and even of jamming the 
 
295 Haefner v. N.Y. Media, L.L.C., No. 150189/08, 2009 WL 634654, at *1 (Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 22, 2009), aff’d, 82 A.D.3d 481 (1st Dep’t 2011).  
296 Haefner, 82 A.D.3d at 481–82. Also illustrative of widespread judicial 
skepticism of group libel claims is Brummett v. Taylor, 569 F.3d 890, 891 (8th Cir. 
2009), in which the group was large but identification of plaintiffs specific. Id. At a 
press conference, the president of a company distributed a complaint that the 
company had filed against its union and 130 named members. Id. In a libel suit by the 
workers, the court determined that the president’s allegedly defamatory statements 
about them at the press conference had not been shown to be understood by their 
audience as specifically referring to individual plaintiffs. Id. at 893. 
297 Levine v. Steve Scharn Custom Homes, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 637, 651–52 (Tex. 
App. 2014) (upholding jury verdict for plaintiff). 
298 See Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 900 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“By claiming that ‘Dan Boyce’s law firm’ had committed unethical business practices, 
defendants maligned each attorney in the firm . . . .”). 
299 Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 137 (D. Mass. 2015) (permitting suit by 
three women who brought sexual assault claims against defendant in the two weeks 
preceding defendant’s statement that the new claims over that period, which 
numbered eleven, were entirely unfounded). 
300 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 36, 66–67 (D.D.C. 
2018) (involving defendant’s accusation that 9 store managers among 457 were 
dismissed for a specific form of misconduct). 
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television transmission of a news report to hush criticism.”301  
Elsewhere the article identified the plaintiff as D.A.R.E.’s leader.  
The court found that he met the “of and concerning” requirement 
through a two-phased line of reasoning.  First, the statements 
linking “D.A.R.E. supporters” to these and other unlawful actions 
“imply that such actions were undertaken at the behest, or 
certainly with the approval, of the organization itself.”302  Second, 
readers would “believe that actions taken on behalf of D.A.R.E., 
including unlawful behavior, were probably directed, encouraged, 
or approved by” the plaintiff.303  This bootstrapping logic’s 
potential for chilling criticism suggests the need for a higher 
evidentiary barrier for such claims.   
Similarly, another court determined that a charge of ethically 
questionable behavior against a public figure’s political action 
committee could plausibly be viewed as implicating the figure 
herself.304  Though a somewhat more plausible conclusion, the 
ruling also throws into question whether a more substantial 
showing should be required to equate followers and their leaders.  
Otherwise, a speech-inhibiting version of respondeat superior 
might creep into group libel doctrine. 
In other settings, too, multiple links in the chain connecting 
plaintiffs to charges against their groups contain the potential for 
excessive availability of claims.  In an older case305 still cited as 
authority,306 the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the following 
statement constituted libel: “The shooting occurred on Avenue E, 
between Eleventh and Twelfth streets, in a house which bears a 
bad reputation with the police.”307  Though the newspaper’s 
account did not specify an address, identify any individuals, or 
describe any reason for the “bad reputation,” the court concluded 
that the article leveled an actionable charge of misconduct against 
the plaintiff homeowner.308  Under the court’s reasoning, “No one 
could doubt that the neighbors and friends of plaintiff . . . would 
 
301 D.A.R.E. Am. v. Rolling Stone Magazine, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1275 (C.D.  
Cal. 2000). 
302 Id. at 1290. 
303 Id. 
304 See Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 933 F.3d 160, 172 (2d Cir. 2019). 
305 Fitzpatrick v. Age–Herald Publ’g Co., 63 So. 980 (Ala. 1913). 
306 E.g., Nelson v. Am. Hometown Publ’g, Inc., 333 P.3d 962, 971 (Okla. Civ.  
App. 2014). 
307 Fitzpatrick, 63 So. at 980. 
308 See id. at 981–82. 
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conclude that the libel was directed to the plaintiff.”309  The 
potential breadth of liability under this theory, allowing suits 
based on indefinite metonymy, threatens to curb robust reporting. 
Even in the notorious case of Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC, 
where the falsehood was egregious and the plaintiffs had real 
cause to be upset by the publication, validation of the suit under 
the small group defamation doctrine raises unsettling questions.310  
In Elias, Rolling Stone magazine published an article accusing 
seven unnamed members of a university fraternity of having 
participated in a gang rape while two other members observed.311  
When the story was discovered to have been fabricated, Rolling 
Stone issued a retraction and an apology.312  In the libel action that 
followed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that each of 
the fraternity’s fifty-three members at the time of the alleged 
incident was entitled to bring suit.313  This decision could not be 
deemed unsupportable on its face.  The court’s conclusions that “a 
reader could plausibly conclude that many or all fraternity 
members participated in alleged gang rape as an institution ritual 
and all members knowingly turned a blind eye to the brutal 
crimes” were based on several passages in the article.314  Moreover, 
the court emphasized the low threshold to be met for the complaint 
to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss.315  
Nevertheless, the court’s reasoning contains the seeds of a 
small group defamation rationale whose reach seems in tension 
with the general bar against group libel actions.  The court opened 
the door to liability by Rolling Stone to each of the fraternity’s 
fifty-three members on the premise that the article ascribed to 
them all at least “guilty knowledge” of the alleged gang rape.316  
That interpretation, in turn, rested largely on the article quoting 
some of the nine members present at the reported rape as having 
said, “ ‘Don’t you want to be a brother,’ and ‘We all had to do it, so 
 
309 Id. at 982. 
310 872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017). 
311 Id. at 100–01. 
312 Id. at 101. 
313 Id. at 108. 
314 Id. at 109. 
315 See id. at 105 (“Plaintiffs need only plead sufficient facts to make it plausible—
not probable or even reasonably likely—that a reader familiar with each Plaintiff 
would identify him as the subject of the statements at issue.” (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))); id. at 106 (“[The allegedly defamatory] statements are to 
be read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs . . . .”). 
316 Id. at 109–10 (quoting Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 227 
(2d Dep’t 1981)). 
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you do, too’ ”—which the court took as indicating that the rape was 
an “initiation ritual.”317  In other words, these comments were 
deemed to signal to the reader the article’s representation that 
every member of the fraternity had committed or knew of acts of 
rape.318  It is doubtful that a reasonable reader would extrapolate 
from these isolated utterances the author’s own accusations 
against fifty-three individuals.  If current doctrine does stretch 
that far, then it is time to revisit the showing required of plaintiffs 
who claim harm under such an attenuated theory. 
Under current doctrine, even decisions dismissing suits based 
on group libel theory can sometimes highlight the unpredictability 
of courts’ approaches.  The treatment of claims arising from 
allegedly defamatory statements about law enforcement agencies 
furnishes one such example.  In Bujol v. Ward, the defendant 
distributed materials asserting that the Street Crimes Unit of 
Jefferson Parish “has a long history of treating innocent, 
law-abiding African-American citizens with hostility, excessive 
force and no respect.  The African-American male is a target of 
abuse of this special unit.”319  The article went on to give accounts 
of two allegedly representative examples of this rampant abuse.320  
In an action by twenty-three members of the forty-six  
member unit, the court concluded that “there [wa]s no showing 
that any one individual in the class . . . [could] satisfy the  
burden of showing that the words referred particularly to  
them individually.”321   
In Diaz v. NBC Universal, Inc., a legend at the end of a film 
based on a gangster’s criminal career stated that a “collaboration” 
between a police officer “led to the convictions of three quarters of 
New York City’s Drug Enforcement Agency.”322  In a suit on  
behalf of agents who served during the period covered by the 
film—variously numbered at 400 and 233 individuals—the court 
held that the legend’s reference “only to three-quarters of the 
group” rendered the claim “incapable of supporting a jury’s finding 
that the allegedly libelous statements refer to them as 
individuals.”323 
 
317 Id. at 109. 
318 See id. at 114 (Lohier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
319 778 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
320 See id. at 1178–79. 
321 Id. at 1180. 
322 337 F. App’x 94, 95 (2d Cir. 2009). 
323 Id. at 96. 
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Though both of these results are defensible—even  
welcome—they stand in notable contrast to the oft-cited case of 
Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.324  Seven years after eighteen 
officers of a city police department were indicted on charges of 
misconduct, a newspaper opined: 
We said at the time, and we still believe, that the entire 
department was under a cloud.  It is inconceivable to us that so 
much misconduct could have taken place without the guilty 
knowledge of the unindicted members of the department.  If so, 
they all were accessories after the fact, if not before and during.325 
Twenty-seven of the presumed fifty-three members of the police 
force who had not been indicted, charged that the editor’s 
statement was libelous.326  The court determined that the group 
was sufficiently defined, the statement sufficiently specific, and 
group members sufficiently identifiable that the statement could 
be understood as charging each unindicted member with criminal 
behavior.327  In contrast to Bujol and Diaz, however, the editor 
expressed his belief—not knowledge—that unindicted officers 
must have known about their colleagues’ misdeeds, and that, if his 
inference was correct, these officers were accessories.  Again, the 
outcome in Brady cannot be condemned as wholly without 
justification.  A would-be critic of law enforcement, however, might 
understandably exercise caution born of inability to forecast the 
analysis a court would apply to a future libel suit. 
V. THE NEXT FRONTIER: DEFAMATION OF AVATARS IN  
VIRTUAL WORLDS 
One reason for restricting plaintiffs’ ability to bring suits 
based on implied defamation is the possibility of unforeseen 
consequences from an unduly expansive conception of libelous 
statements “of and concerning” the plaintiff.  One area in which a 
heightened standard of proof would especially safeguard against 
runaway litigation is claims based on alleged defamation of an 
electronic version of the plaintiff.  Failure to impose strict limits 
on ascertainability in this realm could open the floodgates to 
 
324 84 A.D.2d 226, 240–41 (2d Dep’t 1981). The court’s application of the “intensity 
of suspicion” test is discussed at supra notes 271–273 and accompanying text. 
325 Brady, A.D.2d at 227. 
326 Id. at 228. 
327 See id. at 234–40. 
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lawsuits rooted in virtual “avatars”328 and technological matrices 
yet undevised.  Only where the line connecting a factual charge 
against an electronically created persona with the creation’s 
real-world counterpart is clear, direct, and compelling should 
courts seriously entertain claims under this theory. 
Virtual worlds are designed to enable users to experience 
online existence as a three-dimensional reality.329  There, a user 
creates a three-dimensional virtual avatar whose appearance and 
personality can be chosen and changed at the user’s discretion.330  
In a pioneering article on First Amendment implications of virtual 
worlds, Jack Balkin expressed concern that then-current doctrine 
did not adequately protect the speech rights of owners and users.331  
His initial aim was to establish that virtual worlds were entitled 
to recognition as a form of expression332—a status apparently 
cemented by the Supreme Court’s later recognition of video games 
as warranting First Amendment protection.333  He then urged 
ample freedom from government interference with these worlds to 
the extent they afford opportunities for designers and users to 
explore their imaginations and ventilate their ideas.334  At the 
same time, Balkin acknowledged that some real-world effects 
produced by virtual activities—especially those involving 
commodification of virtual goods and currencies—justify a degree 
 
328 See Avatar, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SOCIAL MEDIA (1st ed. 2016) (stating as 
one definition “a figure controlled by the user in a 3-D graphical environment such as 
a virtual world”); Ralitza Petit, Avatar-Space: The Ego Inc., 44 PERSPECTA 92, 94 
(2011) (“One of the pioneering virtual words, Habitat . . . specifically introduced the 
term avatar as the human body’s virtual counterpart in a graphically presented social 
online community.” (emphasis in original)). 
329 For a helpful description of Second Life, a leading virtual world, see Matt 
Weinberger, This Company Was 13 Years Early to Virtual Reality – and It’s Getting 
Ready To Try Again, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 29, 2015, 7:34 AM), https://www.business 
insider.com/second-life-is-still-around-and-getting-ready-to-conquer-virtual-reality-
2015-3. See also Chin, supra note 189, at 1309–15. 
330 See Pierre Berthon, et al., Advocating Avatars: The Salesperson in Second  
Life, 30 J. PERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT. 195, 198 (2010); Chin, supra note 189,  
at 1310–11; Chris Houliez & Edward Gamble, Dwelling in Second Life? A 
Phenomenological Evaluation of Online Virtual Worlds, 17 VIRTUAL REALITY 263,  
264 (2013). 
331 Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 
63 (2004). 
332 Id. at 63, 68–71. 
333 Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). Balkin had noted that 
lower courts already recognized “first person shooter games” as falling under First 
Amendment protection. Balkin, supra note 331, at 69. 
334 See Balkin, supra note 331, at 70–72. 
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of government regulation.335  Under this rationale, he would allow 
for remedies caused by “communications torts” such as copyright 
and trademark violations.336  Balkin also included defamation in 
this category, but merely noted that libel law “in theory” can apply 
to defamation of avatars.337 
A few years later, Bettina Chin developed this latter 
suggestion at length and with a more definite view toward 
vigorously extending libel law to this sphere.338  She described 
ways in which defamation of a virtual persona can damage the 
reputation and potentially the financial standing of both the 
persona and her real-world counterpart.339  In contrast to Balkin, 
who generally advocated a high degree of internal regulation for 
virtual communities,340 Chin deemed contractual remedies 
particularly inadequate to address defamation of these 
communities’ residents.341  In short, “[I]f the law has specific rules 
that apply to real-world instances of defamation, it should 
similarly apply such rules to virtual spaces to protect the users.”342  
Under Chin’s approach, a plaintiff could recover for defamation of 
her avatar by showing that other residents of the virtual 
community viewed the plaintiff and her avatar as inextricably 
intertwined—so as to make defamation of the avatar tantamount 
to defamation of herself—and that the plaintiff suffered a 
real-world pecuniary harm.343 
While perhaps reasonable in the abstract, such an approach 
could seriously inhibit the free play of expression for which virtual 
worlds exist if plaintiffs were not held to a stringent standard of 
proof.  As with suits based on fiction or group libel, claims of libel 
of avatars require the audience to actively deduce that the alleged 
 
335 See id. at 72, 78–80. 
336 Id. at 73. 
337 Id. at 74. 
338 See generally Chin, supra note 189. 
339 See id. at 1305–07. 
340 See Balkin, supra note 331, at 76 (“Courts and legislatures should give virtual 
communities wide latitude to design their own rules and social norms to deal with 
misbehavior and leave plenty of room for the creativity of the people who design games 
as well as the people who play them.”). 
341 See Chin, supra note 189, at 1316, 1327–28. 
342 Id. at 1328. For the argument that the vast reach and impact of the Internet 
calls for expanding the concept of the relevant community under libel law, see Amy 
Kristin Sanders & Natalie Christine Olsen, Re-Defining Defamation: Psychological 
Sense of Community in the Age of the Internet, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355 (2012). See 
generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007). 
343 See Chin, supra note 189, at 1331–33. 
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defamation actually referred to the plaintiff.  Even Chin 
acknowledged that the centrality of role-playing in virtual worlds 
creates a presumption that “defamation” of a virtual plaintiff does 
not convey an actual fact about an individual.344  This 
presumption, however, should be quite daunting to account for 
virtual worlds’ fundamental premise of nonreality.  Further, the 
attenuation of the link between statements about avatars and 
concrete harm to actual persons is compounded by the protean 
nature of virtual residents.345  Liability for statements about an 
invented character whose appearance and behaviors could change 
at any time should require extraordinary justification. 
Failure to impose this weighty a level of demonstration could 
unleash a torrent of suits over statements maligning avatars.  It 
is possible that even under a less demanding approach most claims 
would ultimately fall short of proving that aspersions cast on 
avatars amount to defamation of plaintiffs.  A more permissive 
standard, however, would still enable a larger number of awards 
to plaintiffs than a stringent barrier.  This prospect would 
generally invite more claims and allow them to survive deeper into 
the litigation process.  Prolonged litigation can exact substantial 
costs even when it does not result in a verdict for the plaintiff.  
Moreover, concerns about jurors’ capacity to assess claims of 
plaintiff identity are amplified in this context.  On top of absorbing 
the nuances of law’s “of and concerning” requirement,  
many—probably most—jurors would need instruction on the 
assumptions, dynamics, and sensibilities of interactions in virtual 
worlds.  Thus, a heightened burden of proof would contain the 
number of such claims, their costly advancement through 
progressive phases of litigation, and the potential for misguided 
jury awards. 
Moreover, the complexity of gauging the outer-world impact 
of besmirching evanescent avatars carries an additional 
implication.  One can decry unfair statements about virtual 
residents without leaping to the conclusion that such statements 
should be subjected to the full-blown machinery of existing 
defamation doctrine.  Any facile assumption that this relatively 
new and still-evolving technology fits neatly into old paradigms 
risks unduly penalizing speech whose ramifications are far from 
 
344 See id. at 1345. 
345 See supra note 330 and accompanying text; see also Chin, supra note 189, at 
1332 (“Identities [of avatars] are arguably fluid and fragile . . . .”). 
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fully understood.  Traditional libel law, even if adjusted to impose 
a higher burden of showing plaintiff identity, may be too blunt an 
instrument to properly weigh the competing interests at stake.  
About a century ago, a news service asked the Supreme Court to 
bar a competitor from copying the former’s news accounts and 
selling them under the latter’s banner.346  Deeming the plaintiff 
service’s interest in its reports as “quasi property”347 and the 
defendant’s use of the service as “unfair competition,”348 the  
Court approved injunctive relief.349  In dissent, however, Justice 
Brandeis objected to the Court’s wholesale transplantation of 
common law concepts to this novel circumstance.  Though 
acknowledging the “obvious injustice” of the defendant’s conduct, 
Justice Brandeis argued that the legislature was far better 
equipped to conduct the factual investigations needed for devising 
an appropriate rule and to erect the machinery for enforcing it.350  
With alleged libel of virtual residents, too, judicial modesty would 
seem to be in order.  In this area, raising the bar to prove plaintiff 
identity may be only the first step in a broader resolution that 
protects reputation without stifling a promising technology or  
free expression. 
Finally, resistance to defamation claims involving avatars has 
an equitable dimension.  The very purpose of virtual worlds is to 
allow users to construct beings who are more than mere extensions 
of themselves.  Users can assume as residents of these worlds’ 
personal histories, ethnic identities, professions, and behaviors 
quite different from their own, and to impart to their creations a 
fluidity of self not available to actual humans.  They can thus give 
free rein to their creative impulses without fear of being  
held legally accountable for the conduct of their avatars.  Having 
distanced themselves from their avatars, users should generally 
be forbidden to claim derivative harm from attacks on their 
counterparts’ reputation.  Selectively conflating a user and avatar 
to pursue libel claims, while insisting on separation for other 
purposes, is to have it both ways and so erode the robust 
expression for which virtual communities are designed. 
 
346 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 232 (1918). 
347 Id. at 236. 
348 Id. at 240. 
349 See id. at 245–46. 
350 Id. at 264–67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
In the decades since the Supreme Court brought defamation 
within the ambit of First Amendment protection, it has devised an 
array of safeguards to preserve ample breathing space for speech 
while respecting the state’s interest in protecting reputation.  
These constraints on states’ ability to ban libel, however, represent 
constitutional minima; states are not obligated to press penalties 
for defamatory expression to their constitutional limit.  One means 
by which states can enhance free speech without undermining 
their core reputational goals is to increase the burden on plaintiffs 
to demonstrate that alleged defamation actually refers to them.  In 
the great majority of libel suits, this change would not raise the 
practical barrier for plaintiffs.  It is only in those instances where 
the expression at issue is not self-evidently “of and concerning” the 
plaintiff that an action would founder because of this requirement.  
And it is in such cases that judicial sophistication about 
defamation doctrine and sensitivity to infringement on speech will 
be most valuable. 
Thus, the specific goal of this Article is to afford more 
discretion to courts to screen from trials charges of libel that 
cannot establish its definite reference to the plaintiff.  A 
heightened test is justified in part by the threshold nature of 
plaintiff identity; failure to show that the disputed statement is 
about the plaintiff renders all other elements of the claim 
irrelevant.  In addition, the determination of whether speech that 
does not mention plaintiffs should be treated as directed at them 
is distinctly vulnerable to misapplication by juries.  The specter of 
such trials and attendant costs, even where a verdict for the 
plaintiff is overturned on appeal, casts an immeasurable pall on 
speech.  The damage to First Amendment values is especially 
acute where this effect dampens creative expression and reporting 
on matters of public concern. 
While adoption of the proposal here would not entirely dispel 
the uncertainty created by the current regime, it would remove 
much of the inhibition caused by fear that words that do not 
expressly target individuals will give rise to actionable defamatory 
inferences by these unnamed plaintiffs.  The potential for such 
deterrence is especially notable in the realms of fiction and 
characterizations of groups.  As the prospect of libel charges born 
of virtual worlds illustrates, however, advancing technology 
creates additional possibilities for individuals to claim that speech,  
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not ostensibly about them, readily translates into speech that is.  
An imposing burden on libel plaintiffs to prove the cogency of this 
link will help shield against future threats to robust expression. 
